Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. v. State Agency\u27s Record v. 1 Dckt. 38037 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-27-2011
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. v. State Agency's Record
v. 1 Dckt. 38037
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. v. State Agency's Record v. 1 Dckt. 38037" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3465.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3465
/ IL · VI)t. - _"'-_of ~~ .. 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 
Real Party in Interest! Appellant, 
and 
MARIA GOMEZ, Claimant (IC 2005-510285), 
v. 
NAMPA LODGING INVESTORS, LLC, 
Employer, and LffiERTY NORTHWEST 
INS. CORPORATION, Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents, 
and 

























EINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 
Real Party in Interest! Appellant, 
and 
LAUREL KULM, Claimant, (IC 2006-012770), 
v. 
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, Employer, 
and INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS 
~~AGEMENT, Surety, 
























GE CY'S RECORD - VOLUME 1 (S.C. Docket # 38037 -
einlger v. ampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et aI. ) - 1 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., ) 
) 




MARIA GOMEZ, Claimant (IC 2005-510285), ) 
v. ) 
) 
NAMPA LODGING INVESTORS, LLC, ) 
Employer, and LIBERTY NORTHWEST ) 












SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., ) 
) 




LAUREL KULM, Claimant, (IC 2006-012770), ) 
v. ) 
) 
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, Employer, ) 
and INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS ) 






AGENCY'S RECORD - VOLUME 1 (S.C. Docket # 38037 -
Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al.) - 1 
SUPREME COURT NO. 38037 
AGENCY'S RECORD 
VOLUME 1 








SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 









CODY DROTZMAN, Claimant (IC2006-006711), ) 
~ ) 
) 
COORS BREWING COMPANY, Employer, and ) 
COORS BREWING COMPANY, Self-Insured, ) 
DefendantslRespondents, 











SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 









TIM STIENMETZ, Claimant (IC 2008-002191), ) 
v. 
G2B CO., INC., Employer, and IDAHO 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents, 















AGENCY'S RECORD - VOLUME 1 (S.C. Docket # 38037 -
Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al.) - 2 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorneys for Respondents: 
William Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Andrew C. Marsh 
Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. 
924 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Kent W. Day (Nampa Lodging Investors) 
Harmon and Day 
PO Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
Alan K. Hull (Mercy Medical Center) 
Anderson Julian & Hull 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Ronald D. Coston (G2B Co., Inc.) 
State Insurance Fund 
Statehouse Mail 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0044 
Blair D. Jayne (Industrial Commission) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
Statehouse Mail 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
AGENCY'S RECORD - VOLUME 1 (S.c. Docket # 38037 -
Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al. ) - 3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF EXHIBITS .................................................................................................................................. (i) 
LAUREL KULM v. MERCY MEDICAL CENTER 
and INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS MANAGEMENT 
VOLUME I 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL, filed May 5, 2009, ............................................................................................ Kulm, p. 1, V-I 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, 
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE, filed June 26, 2009 ......................... Kulm, p.12, V-I 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022, filed July 24, 2009 ............ Kulm, p. 22, V-I 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW, 
filed July 24, 2009 ............................................................................................................... Kulm, p. 30, V-I 
SCOTT McDOUGALL'S LETTER TO ANDREW MARSH, dated September 3,2009 .. Kulm, p. 33, V-I 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE 
AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, filed September 4,2009 ............................................ Kulm, p. 34, V-I 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND 
AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION, filed September 18, 2009 ..................................... Kulm, p. 37, V-I 
MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IN REGARD 
TO THE ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, 
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT; AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION, filed September 18, 2009, ........................................................ Kulm, p. 55, V-I 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW marked as EXH. A and B, and filed with 
MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT, ET AL on September 18,2009, .......................... Kulm, p. 65, V-I 
SEINIGER'S LETTER TO LAUREL KULM, with ATTACHMENTS, dated September 
19, 2009, ............................................................................................................................. Kulm, p. 71, V-I 
MOTION TO ADD AFFIDA VIT OF LAUREL KULM AS AN EXHIBIT TO 
COUNSEL'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER, with AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM, 
filed September 24, 2009, ................................................................................................... Kulm, p. 86, V-I 
MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT, 
WITH EXHIBIT A ATTACHED, filed November 4,2009, ............................................. Kulm, p. 92, V-I 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR ATTORNEY FEE HEARING, dated November 22, 
2009, ................................................................................................................................. Kulm, p. 108, V-I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (S.c. # 38037 -
Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al.) - 1 
ORDER GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS TO THE RECORD, filed 
November 17, 2009, ......................................................................................................... Kulm, p. 113, V-I 
AFFIDA VIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH REGARDING ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE IN 
RENTERIA v. RICK CARLEY CONSTRUCTION LCC and LIBERTY NORTHWEST, 
I.C. 06-507603, with EXHIBITS A F, filed December 24,2009, ................................. Kulm, p. 115, V-I 
VOLUME 2 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S OPENING BRIEF, filed January 19,2010 ....................... Kulm, p. 173, V-2 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, WITH APPENDIX A and B, 
filed May 20, 2010, .......................................................................................................... Kulm, p. 204, V-2 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING 
ATTORNEY FEES AND TO ISSUE A SUBSTITUTE OPINION AND MEMORANDUM, 
With EXHIBITS A 0 ATTACHED, filed June 8, 2010, .............................................. Kulm, p. 253, V-2 
VOLUME 3 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES, filed June 8, 2010, ........................... Kulm, p. 371, V-3 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES AND TO ISSUE A SUBSTITUTE 
OPINION, filed June 16, 2010 .......................................................................................... Kulm, p. 417, V-3 
ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, 
filed July 26, 2009, ........................................................................................................... Kulm, p. 428, V-3 
TIM STIENMETZ v. G2B CO., INC., 
and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES and STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL, filed December 23, 2009, ....................................................................... Stienmetz, p. 434, V-3 
LUMP SUM AGREEMENT, filed December 23,2009, ............................................ Stienmetz, p. 446, V-3 
SCOTT McDOUGALL'S LETTER TO ANDREW MARSH, dated January 13, 
2010, ............................................................................................................................ Stienmetz, p. 456, V-3 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART LUMP SUM AGREEMENT, filed January 26, 
2010, ............................................................................................................................ Stienmetz, p. 458, V-3 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEY 
FEE PURSUANT TO IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a), filed February 1,2010, ............. Stienmetz, p. 462, V-3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (S.c. # 38037 -
Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al.) - 2 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS, filed March 3, 
2010, ........................................................................................................................... Stienmetz, p. 465, V-3 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S ADMISSIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEE HEARING, 
dated May 10, 2010, ................................................................................................... Stienmetz, p. 467, V-3 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S OPENING BRIEF, filed July 8, 2010, ........................ Stienmetz, p. 469, V-3 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES, filed August 31, 2010, ...................................... Stienmetz, p. 500, V-3 
MARIA GOMEZ v. NAMPA LODGING INVESTORS, LLC, 
and LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORPORATION 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES and STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL, filed September 28, 2009, .......................................................................... Gomez, p. 509, V-3 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022, with AFFIDAVIT OF 
ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW, marked as 
Exhibit A, filed October 23, 2009, .................................................................................. Gomez, p. 521, V-3 
STIPULA TION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND ORDER 
OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE, filed October 2,2009, ....................................... Gomez, p. 542, V-3 
SCOTT McDOUGALL'S LETTER TO ANDREW MARSH, dated December 24, 
2009, ................................................................................................................................ Gomez, p. 555, V-3 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP 
SUM DISCHARGE, filed January 4, 2010, ..................................................................... Gomez, p.557, V-3 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEE 
PURSUANT TO IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a), filed January 12,2010, ......................... Gomez, p. 561, V-3 
ANDREW MARSH'S LETTER TO SCOTT MC DOUGALL, dated January 26, 
2010, ............................................................................................................................... Gomez, p. 563, V-3 
ORDER DENYING MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES, filed February 11,2010, ...... Gomez, p. 565, V-3 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S ADMISSIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEE HEARING, 
Filed April 12, 2010, ....................................................................................................... Gomez, p. 567, V-3 
VOLUME 4 . ~ 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S OPENING BRIEF, filed June 11,2010, ......................... Gomez, p. 569, V-4 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES, filed July 22,2010, .............................................. Gomez, p. 595, V-4 
MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES FOR APPEAL, 
filed August 30, 201 0, ..................................................................................................... Gomez, p. 605, V-4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (S.c. # 38037 -
Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al.) - 3 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO RULE ON MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER CONSOLI-
DATING CASES FOR APPEAL, filed August 30, 2010, ............................................. Gomez, p. 608, V-4 
AMENDED MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES FOR 
APPEAL, filed August 31, 2010, ................................................................................... Gomez, p. 610, V-4 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE, filed September 2, 2010, .............................................. Gomez, p. 613, V-4 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, filed September 2, 2010, .......................................................... Gomez, p. 616, V-4 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL, dated September 8, 2010, .............................................. Gomez, p. 622, V-4 
CERTIFICATION, dated September 8, 2010, ............................................................... Gomez, p. 625, V-4 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL, dated September 15, 2010, ............................................ Gomez, p. 626, V-4 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL, (Consolidated Cases), filed October 12,2010, ... Gomez, p. 629, V-4 
ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL, dated October 13,2010, ........ Gomez, p. 640, V-4 
MOTION TO DISMISS FROM APPEAL CONSOLIDATED CASE I.C. 06-006711: 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., APPELLANT/REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, vs. 
COORS BREWING COMPANY, EMPLOYER, AND COORS BREWING COMPANY, 
SELF-INSURED, DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, filed October 14, 2010, ................ Gomez, p. 643, V-4 
STIPULATION TO DISMISS FROM APPEAL CONSOLIDATED CASE I.e. 06-006711: 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. APPELLANT/REAL PARTY IN INTERESTvs. 
COORS BREWING COMPANY, EMPLOYER, AND COORS BREWING COMPANY, 
SELF-INSURED, DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, filed October 14, 2010, ................ Gomez, p. 646, V-4 
ORDER WITHDRAWING CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL ORDER ENTERED 10-13-2010, 
AND SUBSEQUENTLY REMANDING THIS CASE TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
FOR ENTRY OF A FINAL ORDER, dated November 10,2010, ................................. Gomez, p. 649, V-4 
FINAL ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES, filed December 29,2010, ............................ Gomez, p. 652, V-4 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, dated 
February 16, 2011, ........................................................................................................... Gomez, p. 657, V-4 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, dated February 17, 2011, ........................................... Gomez, p. 659, V-4 
LETTER TO AGENCY CLERK FROM DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, BLAIR D. 
JA YNES, REQUESTING ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS INTO THE AGENCY RECORD, 
dated September 15, 2011, ........................................................................................................... p. 662, V-4 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD, dated September 23, 2011, ................................................... p. 664, V-4 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION, dated September 23, 2011, ......................................................... p. 665, V-4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (S.c. # 38037 -
Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al.) - 4 
INDEX 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW, 
filed July 24, 2009, .............................................................................................................. Kulm, p. 30, V-I 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW marked as EXH. A and B, and filed with 
MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT, ET AL on September 18,2009, ............................ Kulm, p.65, V-I 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES, filed June 8, 2010, ...................................................... Kulm, p. 371, V-3 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH REGARDING ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE IN 
RENTERIA v. RICK CARLEY CONSTRUCTION LCC and LIBERTY NORTHWEST, 
I.e. 06-507603, with EXHIBITS A F, filed December 24,2009, .................................. Kulm, p. 115, V-I 
AMENDED MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES FOR 
APPEAL, filed August 31, 2010, .................................................................................... Gomez, p. 610, V-4 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL, (Consolidated Cases), filed October 12,2010 ...... Gomez, p.629, V-4 
ANDREW MARSH'S LETTER TO SCOTT MC DOUGALL, dated January 26, 
2010, ................................................................................................................................ Gomez, p. 563, V-3 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL, dated September 8, 2010, ............................................... Gomez, p. 622, V-4 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL, dated September 15, 2010, ............................................. Gomez, p. 626, V-4 
CERTIFICATION, dated September 8, 2010, ................................................................ Gomez, p. 625, V-4 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD, dated September 23,2011, ...................................... Gomez, p. 664, V-4 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S ADMISSIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEE HEARING, 
Filed April 12, 2010 ........................................................................................................ Gomez, p. 567, V-3 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S ADMISSIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEE HEARING, 
dated May 10, 2010 ..................................................................................................... Stienmetz, p. 467, V-3 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING 
ATTORNEY FEES AND TO ISSUE A SUBSTITUTE OPINION AND MEMORAN-
DUM, with EXHIBITS A - 0 ATTACHED, filed June 8, 2010 ...................................... Kulm, p. 253, V-2 
-CLAIMANT'S COUNSEl/S OPENINGBRlEF,fiIeo January 19, LOI0 .... :.~.-:-: ............. Kulin, p-.17J-;V-2 --
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S OPENING BRIEF, filed June 11,2010 .......................... Gomez, p. 569, V-4 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S OPENING BRIEF, filed July 8, 20 1 O ......................... Stienmetz, p. 469, V-3 
FINAL ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES, filed December 29, 2010 .............................. Gomez, p. 652, V-4 
INDEX (S.c. # 38037 - Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al.) - 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, WITH APPENDIX A and B, 
filed May 20, 2010 ............................................................................................................ Kulm, p. 204, V-2 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL, filed May 5, 2009, ............................................................................................. Kulm, p. 1, V-I 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES and STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL, filed September 28,2009 ............................................................................ Gomez, p. 509, V-3 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES and STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL, filed December 23, 2009 ......................................................................... Stienmetz, p. 434, V-3 
LETTER TO AGENCY CLERK FROM DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, BLAIR D. 
JA YNES, REQUESTING ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS INTO THE AGENCY RECORD, 
dated September 15, 2011 ............................................................................................................ p. 662, V-4 
LIST OF EXHIBITS .................................................................................................................................. (i) 
LUMP SUM AGREEMENT, filed December 23,2009 ............................................. Stienmetz, p. 446, V-3 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022, filed July 24, 2009 ............ Kulm, p. 22, V-I 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022, with AFFIDA VIT OF 
ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF LAW, marked as 
Exhibit A, filed October 23, 2009 ................................................................................... Gomez, p. 521, V-3 
MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES FOR APPEAL, 
filed August 30, 2010, ..................................................................................................... Gomez, p. 605, V-4 
MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT, 
with EXHIBIT A ATTACHED, filed November 4,2009, .................................................. Kulm, p. 92, V-I 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, dated 
February 16, 2011, ........................................................................................................... Gomez, p. 657, V-4 
MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IN REGARD 
TO THE ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, 
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT; AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION, filed September 18, 2009, ......................................................... Kulm, p. 55, V-I 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEE 
-~ -PtJRStJANrTO~l]JAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a), fikd January 12, :lOHl, .......................... Gomez, p. 561, V-3 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEY 
FEE PURSUANT TO IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a), filed February 1,2010, .............. Stienmetz, p. 462, V-3 
MOTION TO ADD AFFIDA VrT OF LAUREL KULM AS AN EXHIBIT TO 
COUNSEL'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER, with AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM, 
filed September 24, 2009, .................................................................................................... Kulm, p. 86, V-I 
INDEX (S.c. # 38037 - Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al.) - 2 
MOTION TO DISMISS FROM APPEAL CONSOLIDATED CASE I.C. 06-006711: 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., APPELLANT/REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, vs. 
COORS BREWING COMPANY, EMPLOYER, AND COORS BREWING COMPANY, 
SELF-INSURED, DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, filed October 14, 2010, ................ Gomez, p. 643, V-4 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE ORDER APPROVING IN P ART STIPULATION AND 
AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION, filed September 18, 2009, .................................... Kulm, p. 37, V-I 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, filed September 2, 2010, ............................................................ Gomez, p. 616, V4 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION, dated September 23, 2011 ............................................. Gomez, p. 665, V-4 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO RULE ON MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER 
CONSOLIDA TING CASES FOR APPEAL, filed August 30, 2010, ............................ Gomez, p. 608, V-4 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART LUMP SUM AGREEMENT, filed January 26, 
2010, ............................................................................................................................ Stienmetz, p. 458, V-3 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP 
SUM DISCHARGE, filed January 4, 201 0, ..................................................................... Gomez, p.557, V-3 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE 
AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, filed September 4, 2009, ........................................... Kulm, p. 34, V-I 
ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL, dated October 13, 2010, ......... Gomez, p. 640, V-4 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS, filed 
March 3, 2010, ............................................................................................................. Stienmetz, p. 465, V-3 
ORDER DENYING MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES, filed February 11, 2010, ....... Gomez, p. 565, V-3 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, dated February 17, 2011, ........................................... Gomez, p. 659, V-4 
ORDER GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS TO THE RECORD, filed 
November 17, 2009, .......................................................................................................... Kulm, p. 113, V-I 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES, filed July 22, 2010, ............................................... Gomez, p. 595, V-4 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES, filed August 31, 2010, ....................................... Stienmetz, p. 500, V-3 
ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, 
filed July 26, 2009, ............................................................................................................ Kulm, p. 428, V-3 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE, filed September 2, 2010, ............................................... Gomez, p. 613, V-4 
INDEX (S.C. # 38037 - Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al.) - 3 
ORDER WITHDRAWING CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL ORDER ENTERED 10-13-2010, 
AND SUBSEQUENTLY REMANDING THIS CASE TO THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION FOR ENTRY OF A FINAL ORDER, dated November 10, 2010, ....... Gomez, p. 649, V-4 
SEINIGER'S LETTER TO LAUREL KULM, with ATTACHMENTS, dated 
September 19, 2009, ............................................................................................................ Kulm, p. 71, V-I 
SCOTT McDOUGALL'S LETTER TO ANDREW MARSH, dated September 3, 2009,. Kulm, p. 33, V-I 
SCOTT McDOUGALL'S LETTER TO ANDREW MARSH, dated December 24, 
2009, ................................................................................................................................ Gomez, p. 555, V-3 
SCOTT McDOUGALL'S LETTER TO ANDREW MARSH, dated January 13, 
2010, ............................................................................................................................ Stienmetz, p. 456, V-3 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR ATTORNEY FEE HEARING, dated November 22, 
2009, .................................................................................................................................. Kulm, p. 108, V-I 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND ORDER 
OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE, filed October 2,2009, ....................................... Gomez, p. 542, V-3 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, 
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE, filed June 26,2009, ........................ Kulm, p.12, V-I 
STIPULATION TO DISMISS FROM APPEAL CONSOLIDATED CASE 
I.e. 06-006711: SEINIGER LAW OFFICE, P.A., APPELLANT/REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST, VS. COORS BREWING COMPANY, EMPLOYER, AND COORS 
BREWING COMPANY, SELF-INSURED, DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, 
filed October 14, 2010, .................................................................................................... Gomez, p. 646, V-4 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES AND TO ISSUE A SUBSTITUTE 
OPINION, filed June 16, 2010, ......................................................................................... Kulm, p. 417, V-3 
INDEX (S.c. # 38037 - Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et aJ.) - 4 
LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Reporter Transcripts were requested by Appellant and Intervenor, as exhibits only, and are 
identified as Additional Documents below. 
CLAIMANTS' EXHIBITS: 
KULM 
Affidavit ofWm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. in Support of Claim for Attorneys Fees, dated November 23, 
2009 with the Exhibits, Nos. 1 - 33. 
STIENMETZ 
Affidavit of Andrew Marsh in Support of Claim for Attorneys Fees, dated May 10,2010 with the 
Exhibits, Nos. 1 - 9. 
Claimant's Counsel's Admissions for Attorney Fee Hearing, dated May 10, 2010 (found in Agency 
Record on page 467 of Volume 3). 
GOMEZ 
Affidavit of Andrew Marsh in Support of Claim for Attorneys Fees, dated April 12,2010 with the 
Exhibits, Nos. 1-10. 
Claimant's Counsel's Admissions for Attorney Fee Hearing, dated April 12,2010 (found in Agency 
Record on page 567 of Volume 3). 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS: 
1. Transcript of Hearing on November 23,2009, Laurel Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center and 
Indemnity Insurance Company ofNA; I.e. No. 2006-012770. 
2. Transcript of hearing on May 11,2010, Tim Stienmetz v. G2B Co., Inc. and State Insurance 
Fund, I.C. No. 2008-002191. 
3. Transcript of Hearing on April 12, 2010, Maria Gomez v. Nampa Lodging Investors, Inc., 
and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation; I.C. No. 2005-510285 
LIST OF EXHIBITS (S.c. docket 38037 -
Seiniger v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, et al. - i 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
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Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
I.C. No. 06-012770 




Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
C01v1ES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES " 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
PAGE 1 OF6 
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BENEFITS, paid prior to Lump Sum, subjected to atty fees $13,206.88 
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to Lump Sum, on the above $3301.72 
~~~~----~--C--oS'f-S,incurr-ed-ifrHt-igatien,pr-evieusly-r-eimbl:li-sed-ro-attBmey-finGl-. -----$1,3943-1--------
experts Radnovich and Barros-Bailey) 
LUMP SUM AMOUNT, New Money 
ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS, to be paid from LSS 
Attorney Fees 
Costs 
TOTAL, Attorney Fees and Costs, to be paid from LSS 
MEDICAL BILLS, to be paid from Lump Sum 







Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney 
Attorney Fee Agreement including Disclosure Statement 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
1. Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. ("Counsel") was retained by Laurel Kulm 
("Claimant") on or about 5/30/2007. 
2. Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and 
circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits, 
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential 
disability beyond impairment, etc. 
3. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for 
benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need 
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation 
Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
PAGE20F6 
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4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
recorded for use in the handling of the claim. 
6. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment 
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's 
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history. 
7. Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested 
documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a 
periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and 
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation 
case. 
9. Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed 
Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, and impairment 
compensation, and disability beyond impairment, and retraining, and attorney fees. Subsequent 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLA.!MANT'S COUNSEL 
PAGE30F6 
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to retaining Counsel, Claimant received additional medical treatment and time loss benefits and 
impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment compensation. 
~-----1-0:---C--ounsel-advised-€laimanHo4lllder-go-a-new-and-separat-e-indepefldent-me-dieal ~---',\c------
evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import ofthe IME report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need 
for present and future medical treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
11. Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by 
a vocational evaluation expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
I 
) 
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the 
/ 
need for retraining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
12. Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel engaged in 
extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant 
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with 
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing. 
13. Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would 
be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers. 
Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for 
resolution to the Commission. 
14. Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants 
resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that 
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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15. Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimant's best judgment and 
personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been 
~- ---stlbmitteci-t"tTihe-C-mnmission-f-erits-appmval. 
16. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed 
portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant. 
17. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing 
program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and 
other fmancial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial 
Commission Form 1022. 
18. As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between 
Claimant and Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately 
5/30/2007 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining 
certain cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel 
maintained an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to 
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his 
other clients. 
19. Claimant is presently employed. 
Dated May 5,2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
:t~~ An Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on May 5, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be served as follows: 
Alan Hull 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL 
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
lRl Hand Delivered 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
H~~ ewMarsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtie Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE 
---'Fhis--is-an-agreement-f{)r-representat-ion-arui-eonsultation--in--a-worker'e-s ---
compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is 
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P .A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho 
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Laurel Kulm, (hereafter referred 
to as "Clientn). 
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
1) Attorney will represent Client in the following action: Kulm v. Mercy Medical 
Center with respect to worker's compensation claim for date of injury of 
November 2, 2006 only. 
2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be in 
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts 
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and 
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That 
portion will be as follows: 
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after 
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If 
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the 
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that 
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to 
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an 
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney 
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless 
it is later disputed. 
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is 
resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party; 
. iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an 
appeal has been filed by either party; 
Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with 
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties 
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against 
the defendant(s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those 
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater. 
'1 
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3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is 
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to 
lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to 
withdraw due to lackOf cooperation m presenting and prosecuting Cllent~~s-­
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7 below. 
4) Actual costs required to prepare and prosecute Client's claim by Attorney, 
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by 
Attorney, these costs will be repaid. from Client's portion of amounts 
recovere!!, as defined in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your 
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are 
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney, 
filing fees, fees for coJ.U1reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process, 
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and 
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related 
mailing costs, and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's 
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills 
outstanding at the time of settlement of Client's claim out of any funds received 
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent. 
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior 
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do 
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and 
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is 
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the 
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval. 
6) Attorney makes no representations concerning the likelihood of a successful 
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to 
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the 
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are 
good faith statements of opinion only; 
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged 
Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as 
well as for all costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows: 
i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, AttorIley 
shall be paid at the rate of $150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated 
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer, 
if any, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is 
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such 
services. 
8 
ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the 
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the 
----.p .... r..,....o'"visiOIIS of this-agreementjust-as-if-the-verdict,awarci,-cietermination 
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client. 
iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Client's documents and 
money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall 
have a lien on the cause of action. 
8) Client '+Yill pay to :fAtome~' an iaitial retainer as Bfl advanee against the costs 
rererred to in Paragraph 4 above in the amount of$100. 
9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will 
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer 
Trust Accounts program. 
lO)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and 
agree to its tenns and conditions. There are no other oral or written 
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this 
contract shall be made in writing. 
ll)This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives 
and assigns of Client and Attorney. 
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case 
within 30 days after settlement or after the· attorney client relationship is 
terminated by either party to this agreement. Mter that time, Attorney's fIJ.e, 
and ali documents and things in it from whatever sou.rce will be destroyed. 
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of 
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall 
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is 
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of 
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain 
Attorney on an hourly basis. and has chosen to retain Attorney on the 
contingent basis described herein. 
I have read the fOregOin~Hne to retain the attorney on an hourly 
basis, this / i!" day of , lOO~. 
~a~ . 




twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in 
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing 
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty 
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may 
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission 
approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees, 
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute. 
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement and 
Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms contained herein. 
DATEDthis J~ dayof9~ ,20oL. 
~Q.~ 
LaurelKulm 
~ day Of-w~~_-,20rL. 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Attorney for Client 
10 
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07/31107 Balance forward 
08/07/07 Copies" NY work comp to Radnovich 
08/07/07 Postage' 
12/13/07 Kuhn, Laurel Impairinent rating 
12/27/07 Copies - Ltr to Rogers with Radnovich report 
12127/07 Postage 
02/01108 Copies - L to Barros w- CD 
02/01108 Postage 
02/01108 compact disc 
02/28/08 PMT #400151830. Kuhn, L. costs 
07/16/08 PMT #400131602. Kuhn, L. costs for upcoming voc eval 
09/04/08 2/8/08,4/15/08, 8/1108, 8/18/08, 8/22/08 (6.1 hours at $135.00 per) 
10/03/08 Long Distance 
10/27/08 PMT #400058744. Kuhn, L. costs 
01113/09 PMT # 1695. Kuhn, Laurel expert payment 
04/13/09 File Closing 
Statement of Costs 
I DATE I 
4/16/09 



















I BALANCE DUE II $10.00 
Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If 
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file 
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2) 
years from the above date. 
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ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. 5th Street, Suite 700 
P. O. Box 7426 
Boise, 10 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
Alan K. Hull - ISB No.: 1568 
Attorneys for Defendants 




MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, 
Employer, 
and 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY 




I.C. No. 06-012770mO - tJ 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, 
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT, AND ORDER OF 
APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
In consideration of the premises and promises and covenants hereinafter 
set forth and subject to the Commission's approval and Order of Discharge 
pursuant thereto, the above-entitled parJo stipulate and agree as follows. 
On or about November 2, 2006, Laurel Kulm, hereinafter referred to as 
Claimant, suffered an industrial accident arising out of and in the course of her 
employment with Mercy Medical Center, hereinafter referred to as Employer. 
On the date of the accident, the Employer had assured its liability under the 
Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho with Indemnity Insurance 
Company of North America, hereinafter referred to as Surety. The Employer, 
Surety and the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho received adequate and 
timely notice of the accident and injury. 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND 
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 1 
At the time of said accident, Claimant was 54 years of age, single, and had 
no children under the age of 18. Claimant worked varjous hours per week and 
earned $22.60 per hour. Claimant incurred no time loss as a result of the injury. 
In the accident of November 2, 2006 1 Claimant was walking when she slipped 
and fell, injuring her lower/mid back, neck, and both knees. 
Claimant/s prior medical history is significant for hypertension, 
hypothyroidism, type II diabetes, sleep apnea, neck and lower back injuries l and 
bilateral meniscal tears and repairs in the summer of 2006. 
On November 3, 2006, Claimant presented to Saltzer Medical Group 
complaining of pain after falling. Claimant advised that while she had fallen onto 
her knees l she had hit her back against the wall. Claimant denied any numbness 
or tingling, as well as any swelling, decreased range of motion, instability, 
crepitus or joint pain. Other than tenderness with palpation over the paraspinous 
musculature throughout the entire spine, the examination was within normal 
limits. Claimant was released to modified duty with no lifting, bending or pulling 
over 15 pounds, as well as no twisting. 
On November 15, 2006, Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical Group 
complaining of bilateral knee pain with somewhat limited range of motion. 
Claimant had no gross swelling but she was tender at the medial line. The 
assessment was sprain/strain of the medial and collateral ligaments. She was 
placed in a right knee brace. She was later given a left knee brace. 
Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical on November 29, 2006, at which time 
she was released to full duty with no restrictions. 
On January 17, 2007, Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical for right leg 
pain and "pulling" since January 12, 2007, when she was injured while walking 
down a hall after physical therapy when her low back went out causing her to 
almost fall. She advised that she had low back, right hip, and right leg pain. 
There was weakness noted of the left leg and Claimant complained of weakness 
in the left lower back, hip and leg. Claimant was assessed with strain/sprain of 
the hip/thigh, low back and groin. She was placed on modifiedduty. 
Claimant returned to Saltzer Medical on February 21, 2007 and reported 
that overall she was doing much better, with the majority of her complaints in the 
lumbar area. With regard to the knees, it was opined that she was fixed and 
stable. Claimant was released to full duty, no restrictions. 
On February 26, 2007, Claimant presented to Nancy Greenwald, M.D .. Dr. 
Greenwald noted that Claimant's gait was good and she was able to walk without 
difficulty. Straight leg raise was negative. Sensory and manual muscle testing in 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND 
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the lower extremities was normal. Claimant's knees were back to baseline. It 
was noted that Claimant had preexisting arthritis and had already established a 
relationship with a chiropractor when she moved to Idaho. Dr. Greenwald felt 
that Claimant had mild soft tissue injuries and there were no radicular findings. 
Claimant could continue working without restriction. 
Claimant saw Dr. Greenwald on March 15, 2007. Dr. Greenwald noted 
that a lumbar spine of the hip demonstrated a larger right piriformis and a cyst. 
Claimant's main complaint was right buttock pain. Dr. Greenwald recommended 
pool therapy. 
Claimant returned to Dr. Greenwald on April 4, 2007, complaining of a new 
onset of right leg pain and numbness, beginning about two weeks earlier when 
she awoke. She was continuing regular chiropractic treatments and Dr. 
Greenwald advised her to discontinue those. Straight leg raise was negative. Dr. 
Greenwald ordered an MRI. 
In an April 26, 2007 letter to the Surety, Dr. Greenwald noted that an April 
5, 2007 MRI showed a moderate-sized disc herniation at L3-4 which was right 
paracentral in location with mass effect upon the descending right L4 nerve root I 
the epidural space. Claimant denied any acute incident, accident, hobby or 
activity that caused the sudden extreme pain. Essentially, Claimant had 
awakened with pain down her right side. In order to address causation, Dr. 
Greenwald recommended review of all chiropractic and other prior medical 
records. 
In a June 6, 2007 letter to the Surety, Dr. Greenwald advised, following 
review of Claimant's prior records, that if the physical therapy incident in January 
of 2007 followed therapy which was prescribed for Claimant's November 2, 
2006, injury, then that near-fall and subsequent right sided pain were work 
related. 
On June 12, 2007, Claimant's position with the Employer was discontinued 
due to a reduction in work force. 
On August 2, 2007, Claimant presented to Beth Rogers, M.D., for 
complaints of right anterior leg pain, low back pain, right knee pain, and 
occasional non-radiating cervical pain. Dr. Rogers' impression was right L4 
radiculopathy, status post bilateral partial medial meniscectomies with underlying 
degenerative changes in both knees, left great~r than right, with the right knee 
being more symptomatic, resolving patellofemoral contusion, and mild cervical 
strain. Dr. Rogers noted that in review of Claimant's medical records, there were 
approximately 122 visits for chiropractic care to address issues with Claimant's 
cervical spine, lumbar spine and bilateral knees. The visits occurred both prior 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND 
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and subsequent to the November 2006 industrial injury. Due to the complaints 
that Claimant had following that injury, she believed the lumbar radiculopathy was 
a result of said injury. She felt Claimant's knees were at baseline and she 
recommended a right L4 transforaminal epidural, as well as a directed course of 
physical therapy. She pi aced Claimant on modified work. On August 6, 2007, 
Dr. Rogers released Claimant for her regular work. 
On November 7, 2007, Claimant advised Dr. Rogers that she had no pain in 
the right leg and overall her back was much better. Dr. Rogers felt Claimant was 
medically stable and gave her a 5 % whole person impairment. Dr. Rogers also 
felt that, given Claimant's disc protrusion, a 50 pound weight limit was a 
reasonable permanent restriction and therefore Claimant could continue doing her 
time of injury job. 
../' 
In August of 2008, Claimant's counsel has a disability evaluation performed " 
by Mary Barros-Bailey, Ph.D., CRC, CDMS, CLCP, NCC, D/ABVE. Following her 
interview of Claimant, and a labor market survey, Dr. Barros opined that Claimant 
sustained a 7- to 10% disability, inclusive of impairment. 
Claimant is working at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. 
Pertinent medical records are attached to the original Agreement as Exhibit 
11 A". 
There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the 
parties as to the degree, if any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need 
for retraining, and the need for future medical benefits. 
Claimant and Defendants, desiring to settle the controversies in an amicable 
way and to avoid the cost and delay of litigation of this claim and to buy their 
peace, have entered into a settlement agreement which is acceptable to Claimant 
and to the Defendants and which is in the best interest of the parties. By reason 
of said settlement agreement, the parties hereto desire to settle and forever 
conclude Claimant's rights under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of 
Idaho. Claimant has offered to accept and the Defendants have offered to pay 
the sum of $13,000.00, as itemized below, as full and final settlement of 
Claimant's claim. The parties agree that settlement is in the best interests of the 
parties. 
It is stipulated and agreed that the aforementioned settlement consideration 
includes loss of wage earning capacity and non-medical factors, should such 
exist. 
The parties waive any Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as part of 
the consideration for this agreement. Claimant hereto specifically and expressly 
waives all rights to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided for under 
Idaho Code § 72-718. 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND 
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In processing this claim, medical expenses in the amount of $12,651.99 













CLAIMANT UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT ANY MEDICAL EXPENSES 
NOT ITEMIZED AS BEING PAID ARE HER RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT UPON 
APPROVAL OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE DEFENDANTS WILL HAVE NO FURTHER 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED TO DATE OR TO BE 
INCURRED IN THE FUTURE, EXCEPT AS HEREIN BEFORE PROVIDED. 
v 
Claimant hereby attests that 1) she is not currently on Medicare; and 2) 
does not expect to be on Medicare in 30 months and that she does not have a 
settlement of over $250,000.00 Claimant attests that neither she nor any of her 
medical providers to her knowledge received Medicare benefits, as provided under 
42 USC Section 1395, as a result of the work-related injuries sustained on 
November 2, 2006, set forth herein. 
The parties hereby recognize that errors running to the benefit of either 
party may have been made in the benefit computations while processing 
Claimant's claim and hereby agree and stipulate that the lump sum consideration 
to be paid upon approval of this agreement takes into account all such errors 
found in the accounting and further stipulate and agree that the Industrial 
Commission is empowered to make any necessary corrections in the accounting 
without the necessity of any party creating an addendum, so long as the amount 
to be paid Claimant, $13,000.00, is not affected. 
An itemization of Claimant's claim as required by the Industrial Commission 
is as follows: 
Permanent Physical Impairment-
5 % of the whole person 
25 weeks @ $310.75 per week 
Permanent Partial Disability-
9%vof the whole person, 
including impairment, or 4% 
20 weeks @ $310.75 per week 
lump Sum Consideration-
(Includes any decreased wage e_arning 
capacity, non-medical factors and 
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LESS: 
PPI benefits paid to date 
PPD benefits paid to date 
AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT 





Attorney fees taken prior to LSS 
($550 Dr . Radnovich & 
Costs taken prior to LSS 
$823.50 Dr. Barros-Bailey) 
Additional attorney fees to be 
taken from LSS 
Additional costs to be taken 
from LSS 
ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS 
Do not deduct from lump sum settlementl 
amount due Claimant 
NONE 
ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS 
TO BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider & amount) 
NONE 
E. Total of Outstanding Medicals 
To be deducted from lump sum settlementl 
amount due Claimant 
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT 
(Subtract Lines C & D relating 
to attorney fees, and Line E 
relating to outstanding 
medicals, from the total 











The parties acknowledge that the nature and . extent o'f this injury , 
temporary and permanent partial disability, permanent impairment, medical and 
related expenses in this matter are uncertain and may be continuing or 
progressive and may exceed those hereinbefore set forth, and the above shall not 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND 
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limit the scope of this agreement or the order of discharge entered by the 
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights and 
claims to all permanent and temporary compensation and all medical and related 
benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discovered or contemplated by the 
parties, except as herein before specifically provided. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and subject to the 
approval of this entire agreement by the Industrial Commission of the State of 
Idaho, the parties hereby stipulate and agree that the Commission may make and 
enter its order approving a lump sum settlement of this claim by the payment to 
Claimant by the Surety of the sum of $13,000.00. 
IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED that this payment is in full and final 
settlement and release of all claims of Claimant, her heirs and representatives, for 
compensation for total and partial temporary disability, medical expenses, both 
past and future, specific indemnity for permanent disability, decreased wage 
earning capacity, and any and all claims which Claimant and her heirs now have 
or may have against the Defendants in the future on account of such accident 
and/or injury under the worker's compensation laws of the State of Idaho. 
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the Defendant Surety shall 
pay the sum within thirty days following their receipt of the approved and 
conformed copy of this entire agreement. Any interest allowable under the 
Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho will not begin to accrue 
until after the thirty-day period. 
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED, STIPULATED AND AGREED that Claimant 
understands that by entering into this agreement, and upon its approval by the 
Industrial Commission, her compensation claims and all rights in connection 
therewith will be finally and forever settled and closed and that she will be forever 
barred from reopening this claim or otherwise claiming additional compensation 
benefits on account of such accident and/or injury. 
Claimant does agree to INDEMNIFY, DEFEND and HOLD MERCY MEDICAL 
CENTER and INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
HARMLESS from and against any further claim for benefit which is, or may be, 
payable pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho and 
which arose out of or is related to said accident and/or injury. This 
indemnification and hold harmless agreement shall in no way inure to the benefit 
of any third party or any party not herein specifically named. 
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED AND AGREED by the parties that it is in their 
best interests that this claim be finally and forever settled, satisfied and 
discharged, and the parties hereto acknowledge that this agreement is made at 
Claimant's request and is the acceptance of her offer by the Defendants. 
Claimant acknowledges that she has carefully read this agreement and legal 
instrument in itsenticety,basce_cejy_edthe advice of hercouns_el, _and that she 
understands its contents and has signed the same knowing that this agreement 
forever concludes and fully disposes of any and all claims of any kind and 
character that she has or may have against the Defendants on account of the 
above injuries. 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND 










STATE OF H3A116 } 
~ k \: SS. County of~\;., J 
By ~J~ AND~H, 7 / 
Attorney for Claimant 
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, Employer, and 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH A AlCA, Surety 
A 
LAUREL KULM, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says; 
That she is the Claimant in the above-entitled claim; 
That she has read the foregoing lump sum agreement, knows the contents 
thereof and believes the same to be true to the best of her knowledge. 
A S~IBSCRrBED AND SWORN ,pr I \ , 2009. day of 
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i cl 
B~~:~~ 60 82 unr 
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
UPON LUMP SUM AGREEMENT 
The foregoing stipulation, agreement and petition having duly and regularly 
come before this Commission, and it appearing that the interests of justice and 
the best interests of the parties herein are, and will be, served by approving this 
agreement granting the order of discharge as prayed for, 
NOW, THEREFORE, the foregoing stipulation and agreement shall be and 
the same herein is approved, and further, the above-entitled proceedings are 
hereby dismissed and concluded with prejudice. 
DATED this day of , 2009. -------
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
By~~ ______________ _ 
Chairman 
By~ __ ~ ________________ __ 
Member 
By~_~ ________________ _ 
Member 
ATTEST: 
By~~ ____ ~ ________ __ 
Assistant Secretary 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND 
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE - 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on , a true and correct copy 
of STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, 
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE and STIPULATION AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, I.C. No.: 06-012770, was served by the method 
indicated below upon each of the following: 
__ U.s. MAIL 
Andrew Marsh 
942 W Myrtle 
Boise, 10 83702 
Kate Beaudreau 
leM, Inc. 
1150 W State, #330 
Boise, 10 83702 
Alan K. Hull 
__ COURIER 
Anderson, Julian & Hull 
250 South 5 th , #700 
P. O. Box 7426 
Boise, 10 83707 
HAND DELIVERED ---
nDr~I~liA.1 
U I \ I U I 1\1 r\ L 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
--- Boise;-Idaho-839B2--~------ -----~-
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 




Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF 
FORM 1022 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and files this MEMORANDUM on the issue of 
Counsel's right to attorney fees on permanent partial impairment awards, together with the 
Affidavit of Andrew Marsh attached hereto and the Exhibits attached to said Affidavit, all in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees as set forth in Counsel's Form 1022 already on file with 
the Commission. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
The law governing claimants' right to be represented by an attorney in a workers' 
compensation case, and the constitutional right of that attorney to be paid an attorney's fee, was 
set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Curr as follows': 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W, Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
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In sua sponte reducing appellants' uncontested attorney fee agreements without 
the suitable advance notice to all of the parties directly involved, accomplished 
··through-properly-enacted-regulations,-and-without-a-meaningfui-hearing,the-----.- --.. --.--------------
Commission has acted in disregard of important constitutional mandates. 
Specifically, the Commission's current stance, as Seiniger aptly points out, fails to 
compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor and fails to recognize 
efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission for 
medical care or procuring an impairment rating. Moreover, the Commission's 
arbitrary actions made suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes of their clients, 
thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship. Finally, the "new 
money" provision preempts representation other than in disputed matters 
once again contravening I.C. § 72-508. The net result of the Commission's sua 
sponte conduct is a deprivation of appellants' property rights under the fee 
agreement without due process of law. Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 692,864 
P.2d 132, 138 (Idaho 1993). (bold emphasis added) 
First, the Court found that an attorney has a constitutional right to be paid for services 
rendered on the whole case, including services rendered as counselor and advocate. 
Second, the Court found that payment of attorney fees cannot be limited to the basis of 
"new money," because that would prevent claimants from receiving legal representation and 
counseling except in "disputed matters." In other words, attorneys would be forced to decline 
representation in cases where at least some (but not necessarily all) of the benefits will likely be 
paid. 
The reasoning for the Court's holding is obvious: When a potential client first consults an 
attorney, it is never clear what benefits, if any, the claimant will ultimately actually be paid. 
Even in a case wherein the claim appears to have been "accepted" by the surety, many 
defenses can be raised by the employer/surety during the course of representation, negotiations, 
or litigation, including the following: 
SEINIGER u..W OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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• Apportionment for alleged "pre-existing conditions," which allegation can be used by 
defendants to reduce a permanent partial impairment benefit. 
• Alleging that claimant "quit his job" during a period in which the claimant was released 
for light-duty work. 
• Alleging that claimant "was terminated for cause" during a period in which the claimant 
was released for light-duty work. 
There are other circumstances in which a claimant may need the services of an advocate 
or litigator in an undisputed-injury case: 
• Refusal by a surety to authorize recommended medical treatment. 
• Efforts by a surety to have a claimant prematurely declared MMI (i.e., released from 
medical care). 
• Refusal by a surety to authorize the primary treating physician's referral to a separate 
medical specialist. 
• Delay by the surety in issuing benefit checks. 
• A subsequent injury or re-injury while the claimant is working light-duty (i.e., prior to 
maximum medical improvement). 
• Attempted "IME Shopping," in which a surety sends a claimant to serial independent 
medical examiners until it finds one who will give a lower PPI rating. 
• A subsequent decision by a surety to reverse its original acceptance of all or part of a 
claim. 
• A subsequent decision by a surety to not accept, or to reverse its original acceptance of, 
the claim for a particular injured body part. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
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(208) 345-1000 
• Dispute between employer and surety as to whether a policy of insurance was in place on 
the date of injury . 
• ~-Thelllaking-ofa- c1aimforTeimbursement-ofmedicallraveh~xpenses;-pharmacy-charges;---------~-----
or medical treatment charges. 
• The lay claimant may need help in understanding and complying with the Idaho workers' 
compensation process. 
Seiniger Law Offices has encountered the above situations in its representation of 
claimants. Our representation and advocacy in these situations has made a positive difference for 
our clients. 
Another example of what a claimant gains by retaining an attorney is that 
communications between the surety (or its attorneys) and the claimant are conducted through the 
claimant's attorney. Thus, the claimant is protected from making statements or agreements 
against interest, signing documents against interest, or being overborne upon by "nurse case 
managers" or other agents of the defendants, who may regard unrepresented parties as less likely 
to know their rights. 
Clearly, the representation and advice given to a claimant by an attorney may be vital to 
protecting the claimant's rights. At a minimum, representation is essential to advising a claimant 
as to what those rights are. 
Denying attorney fees on "uncontested" impairment ratings assigned after counsel has 
been retained and is actively representing a claimant is equivalent to an implicit finding that the 
attorney was of no value in the particular case, or that an attorney is never of sufficient value to 
justify being compensated. 
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If the Commission would adopt a procedure whereby a claimant can come to the 
Commission within some reasonable number of days before or after the claimant's initial 
--~---~-meeting-with~elaimant'-s-attorney~and--obtain~a-guarantee~that-any-benefits-wiB-be~paid-andthat-no-~--~----··-
defenses exist as to those benefits, then a claimant's attorney (despite its constitutional rights as 
set forth above) could voluntarily agree not to take an attorney fee on those benefits. Of course, 
such a procedure could never be established, because all defenses remain open to defendants in a 
workers' compensation case as a matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by 
the Commission. 
In sum: 
• Injured workers have the right to hire an attorney of their choosing as advocate and 
counselor, and to contract to pay the attorney a fee for those services. 
• The attorney has a constitutional right to be paid the contracted fee for providing 
the requested services. 
Counsel has been informed that on some occasions the Commission has relied on 
Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (Idaho 1998), in denying attorney fees on a PPI 
award. Mancilla was cited with approval in Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2 
P.3d 735 (Idaho 2000), which in tum generally cited other cases such as Rhodes v. Indus. 
Comm., 125 Idaho 139,868 P.2d 467 (Idaho 1993). 
However, the Mancilla line of cases does not cite Curr, nor do they address the 
constitutional holdings of Curr as set forth above. Unless and until such time as the Idaho 
Supreme Court explicitly overrules its constitutional holdings in CU", it remains good law. 
Specifically, there is nothing in the Mancilla case to the effect that an attorney in a 
workers' compensation matter cannot be compensated "for acting solely as a counselor." There 
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942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022 
PAGE50F8 
is nothing in it to the effect that an attorney cannot be compensated for advocacy efforts "that do 
not generate monetary awards." There is nothing in it to the effect that attorney fees are limited 
" " 'T't.. • thin·· th ~ . +t..~. .1.. • • __ 1 ----to--new-money-;--1:uel'e-1S-UO .... g-ill'1t-tO-' e-en:eetuTa:t--an-att{)rneyl.las-nereonstttnttoill1l----------~----
"property rights under the fee agreement." Accordingly, Mancilla cannot be considered to hav~ 
overruled Curr on these issues. 
Counsel has also been informed that the Commission has recently issued an opinion in 
which it cites Mancilla in support of a denial of attorney fees on PPI benefits. In its "Order 
Releasing Retained Proceeds" in Sandra Perez v. Idaho Fresh Pak, Inc. and Liberty Northwest 
Insurance Corp., IC No. 2005-530757 (2009) (no citation available), the Commission stated in 
pertinent part on page 4 that "in order to support an award of fees, it must be sho'wn that 
Claimant's entitlement to the funds in question was disputed ... " (Emphasis in original.) This 
ruling is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's constitutional holding in Curr, but we presume 
this is because the constitutional issues were not raised by the parties in Perez. As quoted above, 
Curr struck down a provision that "preempts representation other than in disputed matters." 124 
Idaho 686, 692, 864 P.2d 132, 138. Again, since Curr remains good law, claimants in Idaho are 
allowed to obtain legal representation in matters "other than in disputed matters," and attorneys 
with whom they contract are constitutionally allowed to be paid. 
Put another way, if the ruling in the recent Perez case were to be broadly enforced, 
claimants in Idaho would not be able to obtain legal representation until after they had been 
evaluated for a PPI rating-unless they could find attorneys who could afford to provide legal 
counseling and advocacy services pro bono for the weeks, months, or years preceding a PPI 
rating. Counsel respectfully submits that neither the Idaho Legislature nor the Idaho Supreme 
Court has ever intended, nor would public policy favor, depriving Idaho's injured workers of 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022 
PAGE60F8 
their constitutional right to seek the advice and advocacy of counsel at every stage of a worker's 
compensation matter. 
DISeuSSIONw--.--
In the instant case, Seiniger Law Offices, as Counsel for Claimant, provided extensive 
legal services from 2007 to the present. Among many other services, these included acting as 
"counselor," and making efforts as an advocate for Claimant on issues or concerns that did not 
involve "monetary awards." Counsel and Claimant, as was their right, had entered into a fee 
agreement that specifically provided for Counsel's compensation to include a percentage of 
benefits obtained from a PPI rating given after execution of the agreement. 
The services provided by Counsel are set forth in the accompanying Affidavit of Andrew 
Marsh and its exhibits. They establish that Counsel provided services of a nature and extent 
sufficient to establish Counsel's property rights under Curr for compensation. 
Dated July 24, 2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on July 24,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM, together with the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, except for the exhibits to the 
~-~-~--afficlavit-(whieh-are-omitted-due-t(J~e-volume-of-pages-butwhleh-wilt~be-pmvicled-up(Jn-request}-~------­
to be served as follows: 
Alan Hull 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL 
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 
POBox 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
00 Mail 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P A 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022 
PAGE 8 OF 8 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
-----Boise,Idaho-83-1{1z--·· -.---.... -----------
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 




Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
And 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Ada ) 
I.e. No. 06-012770 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., and attorney of record 
for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. was retained by Claimant in regard to the above matter on or 
about 5/30107. A copy of the engagement agreement has been previously provided to the 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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Commission as an attacbment to my Form 1022. The engagement agreement reads in 
pertinent part: 
AttorneywiUiaIre-a-percentage-of-any-benefits-obtained-by-~­
Client with respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating 
is given after the parties execute this agreement. 
The above clause was in typed in bold in the original. The meaning and import of a 
permanent partial impairment rating was explained and discussed with Claimant prior to 
execution. 
3. In retaining Counsel, Claimant specifically sought the services of Counsel as counselor 
and as advocate. 
4. At that time of retaining Counsel, Claimant wanted advice and assistance on, inter alia, 
what she viewed as efforts by the surety and the doctor to prevent her from receiving 
worker's compensation benefits. In a written "Workmen's (sic) Compensation Summary" 
provided to Counsel on or about the time Counsel was retained, she stated as follows: 
"Dr. Greenwald and Steve Haase want all medical records from Dr. Mayes (Chiropractic) 
trying to claim that my injury is 'not' Workmen's Compensation Related. Prior Injury 
related." 
5. On many occasions, Counsel provided legal counseling and/or legal advocacy on many 
topics and issues, including: Claimant's rights under the work comp statutes; the work 
comp process and procedure; the medical treatment issues as they related to work comp 
law and procedure; maximum medical improvement (MMl) issues; permanent partial 
impairment (pPI) issues; permanent work restriction issues; vocational evaluation expert 
issues; permanent partial disability (PPD) issues; the right of the employer to terminate 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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her; and the effect of an employer-proposed "Separation Agreement and General 
Release" on her rights to worker's compensation benefits. 
-~--I6~.-In-representing-Glaimant,this-office-drafted,r-eviewed,analyzed,andJBr-aBted-uJ?0n-the-------
documents attached hereto as Exhibit A. This includes hundred of pages of 
correspondence, damages and bills, fee and cost records, Industrial Commission records, 
and medical records. 
7. In representing Claimant, this office engaged in many phone transactions as listed in 
Exhibit B, email transactions as listed in Exhibit C, and meeting and note transactions as 
listed in Exhibit D. 
8. The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum Settlement (listed in my Form 1022) include PPI 
benefits of $7768.75, on which attorney fees of$1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of 
$5438.13, on which attorney fees of$1359.53 were paid (see demand letters to the surety 
dated 9/18/08 and 9/28/08, attached hereto as Exhibit E and Exhibit F respectively). 
FURTIIER SA YETI! YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
Dated July 24,2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
4W~ Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on July 24, 2009 . 
... ~~~~;~.... W -p L_J ;;:J~tp 
I~ ~..". .. -...;.:.~~'#~ No~ Public for Idaho 
i~ r ~OT",~ r'~ \ Resldmg a:: l:-lv.-"",-F.- ide.. "'-.0 
i U i _._) ~ j My COmmISSIOn expIres: 1/1-<;; /2- 0 I L 
': "J:I{JB L\C = ;if'...... " .... ".. •• 0 Ai .... "'Il'. •••••••• ~ .. ~ 
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
C.L. "BUTCH" OlTER, GOVERNOR 
PO Box 83nO 
Boise, ID 83 nO-0041 
(208) 334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321 
1-800-950-2110 
COMMISSIONERS 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman 
Thomas E. Limbaugh 
Thomas P. Baskin 
Mindy Montgomery. Director 
~ '-. . - .-.~.- -- ------_ .- .--.-.. --- -----.-'--.-------~------------ ---.------
September 3, 2009 
Andrew Marsh 
Seiniger Law Office 
942 W Myrtle 
Boise, ID 83702 
Re: Claimant: Laurel Kulm 
IC #: 2006-012770 
Proposed settlement with Indemnity Insurance Company of America 
Dear Mr. Marsh: 
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed settlement agreement 
referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also considered 
your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12 regarding your representation of 
the claimant and your proposed fees. The Commission staff has made an initial determination 
that the settlement is in the best interests of the parties, except for the portion of the requested 
fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum Consideration, which have not 
been found to be reasonable per IDAP A 17.02.08.033. 
Please be aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in 
accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing 
available funds, and fees which have been determined to be reasonable. 
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ORDER APPROVING IN PART 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, 
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT 
FILE D 
SEP 0 4 2009 
INDUSTRIAl·COMMISSION 
This matter came before the Commission on the request of the parties to approve a Lump 
Sum Agreement. The Commission desires to approve the agreement, except for a portion 
relating to attorney fees. Having fully reviewed the proposed settlement and being fully advised, 
the Commission finds that the agreement is in the best interests of the parties. THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Lump Sum Agreement proposed by the parties is 
approved, with the exception of a portion of the claim for attorney fees submitted by Claimant's 
attorney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Commission approves the request for attorney fees 
and costs as those services related to the lump sum consideration. The total lump sum 
consideration amount is $12,223.13. Fees from that amount have been requested at 25%, which 
is reasonable. Fees and costs amount to $3,055.78 and $10.00 respectively, for a total of 
$3,065.78. However, Attorney has previously withheld $3,301.72 as fees, un-itemized as to the 
specific benefits obtained other than "Benefits, paid prior to Lump Sum ... " Such fees have not 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT - 1 
been substantiated to the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033. 
Thus, no fee proceeds from the settlement shall be made payable to Attorney. Surety will release 
to Attorney $10.00 for costs. Further, inasmuch as the fees previously taken exceed by $245.94 
those fees found reasonable, Claimant's attorney shall reimburse the trust account for this 
claimant the amount of$245.94. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety release to Attorney the sum of $3,250.00, 
which is the balance of the amount of the proceeds of the Lump Sum Agreement requested for 
unsubstantiated attorney fees. This amount shall be held in trust by Attorney pending further 
order of the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety pay to Claimant the remaining sum of 
$9,740.00. 
Claimant's attorney previously been advised in writing of this determination and his right 
to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees. 
DATED this L.f!,day of SepieMW ,2009. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on ~ ~ ,J&) 9 , a true and correct copy of ORDER 
APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP 
SUM SETTLEMENT, regarding IC # 2006-012770, was served upon the parties listed below 
as follows: 
x US MAIL COURIER --
Andrew Marsh 
942 WMyrtle 
Boise, ID 83702 
Kate Beaudreau 
ICM, Inc 
1150 W State, #330 
Boise, ID 83702 
Alan K. Hull 
Anderson, Julian & Hull 
250 South 5th , #700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT - 3 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
C:\VEO , 
TRt COr1r1iSS10N 




Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
And 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, 
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT; 
AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel, pursuant to I.C. 72-718 and lRP. 3 (F), and hereby 
moves the Commission to Reconsider its ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION 
AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT filed September 4, 2009 
(hereinafter "ORDER") (attached hereto as Exhibit A) and also hereby files Counsel's 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion. 
The grounds for this motion are, in regard to the finding in the ORDER that requested 
attorney fees were not reasonable, as follows: 
1. The ORDER has no basis in fact or in law. 
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2. The ORDER is internally inconsistent, with said inconsistencies being irreconcilable, in 
that it finds attorney fees on some permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits to be 
reasonable, and attorney fees on other PPD benefits to be unreasonable, even though the 
factual basis for both sets of PPDs is one and the same. 
3. The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Counsel as set forth in Curr v. Curr, 
124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993). 
4. The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Claimant who, having engaged legal 
counsel and having contracted for payment of counsel, has the right to have said contract 
honored. 
5. The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Counsel to Equal Protection, in that it 
applies a separate and unequal standard for determining the reasonableness of fees for the 
legal profession and the medical profession in their provisions of services to claimants. 
6. The ORDER fails to provide reasonable notice to Counsel of the factual and legal basis 
for denying attorney fees to Counsel, in that the Commission failed to make findings of 
fact and conclusions oflaw in its ORDER, even though these are required for proper 
review of an order by the Idaho Supreme Court, and in that the Commission failed to 
comply with its own regulations requiring Counsel to be provided notification "in 
writing" of "the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," as 
required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.a. 
7. The Commission's interpretation and application of its ID AP A rules in this case has led 
to results that are contrary to the legislative intent of "sure and certain relief for injured 
'workmen" (l.e. 72-201) in enacting the worker's compensation law; contrary to the 
delegation of power under I.C. 72-508 to "promulgate reasonable rules and regulations 
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for effecting the purposes of this act;" contrary to public policy that favors ensuring that 
claimants have access to counsel; and contrary to public policy in that it is likely to 
damage the attorney-client relationship. 
The facts supporting this Motion are set forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. 
The relief sought by this Motion is for the ORDER to be amended to approve in full the 
"Stipulation and Agreement and Release and Lump Sum Settlement" that was the subject matter 
of the original ORDER., including approval of Counsel's attorney fees as set forth in said Lump 
Sum Settlement Agreement. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Claimant was injured in the workplace and solicited and contracted the services of 
Counsel, who provided lawful services as counselor and advocate. In that capacity, Counsel 
ultimately negotiated a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA), which was submitted to the 
Commission for approval in May, 2009. The Commission issued its ORDER on September 4, 
2009, in which it approved the LSSA as between Claimant and Defendants, but ruled that 
Counsel's claims for attorney fees were unreasonable in part. The Commission offered no 
explanation for its ruling. Counsel maintains that he is constitutionally and legally entitled to his 
attorney fees in full, and that Cla.i!J-lant is entitle~ to have her fee contra~t with Counsel honored. 
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COUNSEL'S ACTIONS HAVE BEEN REASONABLE 
In the representation of Claimant, including Counsel's claims for attorney fees, Counsel 
was in full compliance with his legal, professional, and ethical obligations, all as set forth in the 
Idaho Constitution, Idaho statutes, Idaho rules, and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
including Rule 1.5 regarding attorney fees. Counsel was also in full compliance with Counsel's 
legal, professional, and ethical obligations under the fee and engagement contract executed by 
Claimant for Counsel's services. See Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, attached to the foregoing 
Motion as Exhibit B. 
In sum, Counsel has acted reasonably and has met all Constitutional and legal 
requirements for receiving his attorney fees. 
THE COMMISSION HAS RULED THAT COUNSEL ACTED 
UNREASONABLY, BUT GAVE NO REASONS FOR SO RULING 
On September 4,2009, the Commission issued its order titled ORDER APPROVING IN 
PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
(hereinafter "ORDER"). The ORDER states that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to 
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033." 
The ORDER also states that "Claimant's attorney [has] previously been advised in 
writing of this determination and his right to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees," an 
apparent reference to a letter to Counsel dated 9/3/09 from Scott McDougal, Manager of the 
Claims and ffenefits-&ttiOIi oftl1e Commjssiorr(attaclled tD the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh). 
The letter states that a "portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the 
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$12,223.13 Lump Sum Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 
17.02.08.033." 
Although IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.a requires that Counsel be notified "in writing" of 
''the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," the letter from Mr. 
McDougal does not list any reasons, nor does the ORDER itself. 
In sum, the Commission has already ruled that Counsel acted unreasonably, but has not 
notified Counsel of the legal or factual basis for its ruling, and has failed to comply with its own 
regulations requiring the giving of notice. 
ISSUES AND DISCUSSION 
THE ORDER HAS NO BASIS IN FACT OR IN LAW 
As set forth above, there are no facts that would support the ORDER's ruling that a 
portion of attorney fees claimed was unreasonable. In addition, Counsel knows of no 
constitutional or legal basis for denying attorney fees, and the Commission has not offered any. 
It is self-evident that an order from a tribunal has to have a basis in fact and in law. 
THE ORDER IS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT 
The ORDER is internally inconsistent, with said inconsistencies being irreconcilable, in 
that it finds attorney fees on some permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits to be reasonable, 
and attorney fees on other PPD benefits to be unreasonable, even though the factual basis for 
both sets of PPDs is one and the same. 
~ l'(H-eGap,the~Lump-SumSettlementAgreement (LSSA} provldes-IoI benefits for ~ 
Permanent Partial Disability of $6215.00 and Lump Sum Consideration of $12,223.13 for 
"decreased wage earning capacity, non-medical factors and permanent partial disability, if any." 
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See Page 5 of the LSSA and also the chart titled "Kulm Benefits and Fees," both attached to the 
Affidavit of Andrew Marsh which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
The ORDER does not allow Counsel to receive attorney fees on the permanent partial 
disability that is contained in the line item of the $6215.00 (hereinafter "Unreasonable PPD"), 
but it does allow fees on the permanent partial disability that is contained in the line item of the 
$12,223.13 (hereinafter "Reasonable PPD"). In other words, the Commission ruled that it was 
reasonable for Counsel to claim attorney fees on some portions of the permanent partial disability 
benefits but not on others. The ORDER gives no clue for the differing treatment. 
This ruling was made despite the fact that there is no dispute that all PPD benefits were 
obtained as a direct result of Counsel obtaining a vocational evaluation report from Dr. Mary 
Barros-Bailey (attached to the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh) and sending her findings of disability 
beyond impairment to the surety along with a demand for PPD benefits. (See demand letters to 
the surety dated 9/18/08 and 9/28/08, attached to the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh.) After 
receiving the demand, the surety ultimately began making PPD payments (see check no. 
1164166 from surety dated 10/16/08, attached to the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh), many months 
before settlement was reached. 
The attorney's fee ruled to be unreasonable totals $3,301.72, which amount was 
itemizedl in the AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW filed with the Commission on July 24, 2009, in paragraph 8 (attached to the Affidavit 
of Andrew Marsh which is attached hereto as Exhibit B): "The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum 
Settlement (listed in my Form 1022) include PPI benefits of $7768.75, on which attorney fees of 
1 Inexplicably, the ORDER on page 1 characterizes the $3,301.72 as "un-itemized" by Counsel. 
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$1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of$5438.13, on which attorney fees of$1359.53 were 
paid (see demand letters to the surety dated 9/18/08 and 9/28/08, attached hereto as Exhibit[sD." 
Counsel can hazard no guess as to why the Commission ruled that it was not reasonable 
to claim attorney fees on some PPD benefits but not others, given that both the "Unreasonable 
PPD" and the "Reasonable PPD" resulted from the exact same advocacy efforts of CounseL 
One might argue that the Commission simply made a mistake--that it got confused and 
assumed that all of the $3,301.72 in unreasonable fees was on the permanent partial impairment 
benefits, when in fact only $1942.19 in fees was claimed on PPI. Counsel considers the mistake 
theory to be unlikely for these reasons: 
• The Commission was aware that the PPI rating was only 5%; that this percentage 
translated to benefits of$7,768.75; and that a claim of $3,301.72 on that amount 
would equal an attorney's fee of a whopping 42.5%. 
• The Commission had received on July 24, 2009 the above-referenced AFFIDAVIT 
OF ANDREW C. MARSH, which contained the above-referenced itemization in 
paragraph 8, and which contained exhibits of the demand letters for PPD benefits that 
resulted in the surety starting to pay PPD benefits many months before a settlement 
agreement was even reached. 
• The Commission's ORDER says it issued the order only after "Having fully reviewed 
the proposed settlement and being fully advised." 
"considered your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12." 
Clearly, then, it was no mistake that the Commission ruled that an attorney fee claim on 
some of the PPD benefits was reasonable and some of it was unreasonable. In other words, the 
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Commission's ruling was made knowingly and purposefully. It is self-evident that since the 
ORDER is prima facie internally inconsistent, the Commission should reconsider its ruling. 
THE ORDER VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
COUNSEL UNDER CURR 
The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Counsel as set forth in Curr v. Curr, 
124 Idaho 686,864 P.2d 132 (1993). 
The law governing the constitutional right of an attorney to be paid an attorney's fee was 
set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Curr as follows: 
... the Commission's current stance, as Seiniger aptly points out, fails to 
compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor and fails to recognize 
efforts that do not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission for 
medical care or procuring an impairment rating. Moreover, the Commission's 
arbitrary actions made suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes of their clients, 
thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship. Finally, the "new 
money" provision preempts representation other than in disputed matters 
once again contravening I.e. § 72-508. The net result ... is a deprivation of 
appellants' property rights under the fee agreement without due process of law. 
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 692,864 P.2d 132, 138 (Idaho 1993). (bold 
emphasis added) 
First, the Court found that an attorney has a constitutional right to be paid for services 
rendered on the whole case, including services rendered as counselor and advocate. 
Second, the Court found that payment of attorney fees cannot be limited to the basis of 
"new money," because that would prevent claimants from receiving legal representation and 
counseling except in "disputed matters." In other words, attorneys would be forced to decline 
~ ~ r~epr~entatiQnj!1<::asy~~ \Vh~re at l~as! s91Ile~ (b!!t }!ot nece~sarily all} ~>fft1e benefi~ ~ li!cely be 
-- - ~ 
paid. 
The reasoning for the Court's holding is obvious: When a potential client first consults an 
attorney, it is never clear what benefits, if any, the claimant will ultimately actually be paid. In 
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fact, Curr also holds that "Reasonableness [of a fee agreement] ... derives from the totality of 
the circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement was 
made." Id at 136, 690. In other words, if at the time of contracting for an attorney the contracting 
parties had reasonable concerns that advocacy might be needed to address existing or potential 
disputes, the benefit of hindsight may not be used for a finding that it was unreasonable to so 
contract. 
Even in a case wherein the claim appears to have been "accepted,,2 by the surety, many 
defenses can be raised by the employer/surety during the course of representation, negotiations, 
or litigation, including the following: 
• Apportionment for alleged "pre-existing conditions," which allegation can be used by 
defendants to reduce a permanent partial impairment benefit. 
• Alleging that claimant "failed to cooperate" with medical providers or treatment. 
• Alleging that claimant "quit his job" during a period in which the claimant was released 
for light-duty work. 
• Alleging that claimant ''was terminated for cause" during a period in which the claimant 
was released for light-duty work. 
There are other circumstances in which a claimant may need the services of an advocate 
or litigator in an undisputed-injury case: 
• Refusal by a surety to authorize recommended medical treatment. 
• Ef!ort:s_ ~L a_~urety ~o haye a claimant prematurely declared MMI (i.e., released from 
medical care). 
2 Note that it can be almost impossible to prove that a claim was denied. The clever employer can merely answer the 
complaint with ''under investigation," allows months to go by in which it ignores demands to begin paying benefits, 
then when claimant moves to compel payment, the employer can respond that it never put in writing that the claim 
was denied and that therefore it never did deny the claim-it was always just ''under investigation." 
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• Refusal by a surety to authorize the primary treating physician's referral to a separate 
medical specialist. 
• Delay by the surety in issuing benefit checks. 
• A subsequent injury or re-injury while the claimant is working light-duty (i.e., prior to 
maximum medical improvement). 
• Attempted "IME Shopping," in which a surety sends a claimant to serial independent 
medical examiners until it finds one who will give a lower PPI rating. 
• A subsequent decision by a surety to reverse its original acceptance of all or part of a 
claim. 
• A subsequent decision by a surety to not accept, or to reverse its original acceptance of, 
the claim for a particular injured body part. 
• Dispute between employer and surety as to whether a policy of insurance was in place on 
the date of injury. 
• The making of a claim for reimbursement of medical travel expenses, pharmacy charges, 
or medical treatment charges. 
• The lay claimant may need help in understanding and complying with the Idaho workers' 
compensation process. 
Another example of what a claimant gains by retaining an attorney is that 
communications between the surety (or its attorneys) and the claimant are conducted through the 
claimant's attorney_ Thus,_ the_ claimant is pro1ected from making statements or agreements 
against interest, signing documents against interest, or being overborne upon by "nurse case 
managers" or other agents of the defendants, who may regard unrepresented parties as less likely 
to know their rights. 
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Clearly, the representation and advice given to a claimant by an attorney may be vital to 
protecting the claimant's rights. At a minimum, representation is essential to advising a claimant 
as to what those rights are. 
Denying attorney fees on ''uncontested'' impairment ratings assigned after counsel has 
been retained and is actively representing a claimant is equivalent to an implicit finding that the 
attorney was of no value in the particular case, or that an attorney is never of sufficient value to 
justify being compensated. 
In sum, the attorney has a constitutional right to be paid the contracted fee for 
providing the requested services. 
Counsel has been informed that on some occasions the Commission has relied on 
Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (Idaho 1998), in denying attorney fees on a PPI 
award. Mancilla was cited with approval in Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2 
P.3d 735 (Idaho 2000), which in turn generally cited other cases such as Rhodes v. Indus. 
Comm., 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (Idaho 1993). 
However, the Mancilla line of cases does not cite Curr, nor do they address the 
constitutional holdings of Curr as set forth above. Unless and until such time as the Idaho 
Supreme Court explicitly overrules its constitutional holdings in Curr, it remains good law. 
Specifically, there is nothing in the Mancilla case to the effect that an attorney in a 
workers' compensation matter cannot be compensated "for acting solely as a counselor." There 
is nothing in it to the effect that an attorney cannot be compensated for advocacy efforts "that do 
not generate monetary awards." There is nothing in it to the effect that attorney fees are limited 
to "new money." There is nothing in it to the effect that an attorney has no constitutional 
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"property rights under the fee agreement." Accordingly, Mancilla cannot be considered to have 
overruled Curr on these issues. 
Counsel has also been informed that the Commission has recently issued an opinion in 
which it cites Mancilla in support of a denial of attorney fees on PPI benefits. In its "Order 
Releasing Retained Proceeds" in Sandra Perez v. Idaho Fresh Pak, Inc. and Liberty Northwest 
Insurance Corp., IC No. 2005-530757 (2009) (no citation available), the Commission stated in 
pertinent part on page 4 that "in order to support an award of fees, it must be shown that 
Claimant's entitlement to the funds in question was disputed ... " (Emphasis in original.) But as 
quoted above, Curr struck down a provision that "preempts representation other than in disputed 
matters." 124 Idaho 686, 692,864 P.2d 132, 138. Again, since Curr remains good law, claimants 
in Idaho are allowed to obtain legal representation in matters "other than in disputed matters," 
and attorneys with whom they contract are constitutionally allowed to be paid.3 
THE ORDER VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
CLAIMANT 
The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Claimant who, having engaged legal 
counsel and contracted for payment of Counsel, has the right to have said contract honored. Put 
another way, injured workers have the right to hire an attorney of their choosing as advocate and 
counselor, and to contract to pay the attorney a fee for those services. 
The Curr case also stated: 
An attorney fee agreement constitutes a valid contract under Idaho law, and 
appellants performed services for their clients in reliance on the terms of the fee 
agreements. -It IS crear that, in Idaho, partIes to a contract have Ii Property interest 
in the subject matter of the contract that is protectable**138 *692 both under the 
3 If the ruling in the recent Perez case were to be broadly enforced, claimants in Idaho would not be able to obtain 
legal representation until after they had been evaluated for a PPI rating-unless they could find attorneys who could 
afford to provide legal counseling and advocacy services pro bono for the weeks, months, or years preceding a PPI 
rating. 
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Contract Clause ... and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 
[citations omitted] ... In addition, the right to follow a recognized and useful 
occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee of liberty under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13. 
[citations omitted] 124 Idaho 686,691,864 P.2d 132, 137. 
In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public 
welfare, the Commission must afford due process to the contracting parties, i.e., 
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time [citation omitted] 124 
Idaho 686, 692, 864 P.2d 132, 138. (emphasis added) 
It is notable that the Court refers to contracting "parties" in the plural sense, indicating 
that both parties to an attorney fee contract have constitutional and property rights in seeing the 
contract enforced. In other words, the claimant has just as much right as the attorney does to 
have the fee contract enforced. 
Moreover, the language used indicates that the "due process" requirement applies to both 
parties, meaning that the Claimant, too, should have notice and an opportunity to be heard on 
whether she wishes the contract to be enforced on its terms. The ORDER was entered without 
any such notice to the Claimant and opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the ORDER violates 
the Constitutional rights of Claimant, and should be reconsidered. 
THE ORDER VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
COUNSEL TO EQUAL PROTECTION 
The ORDER violates the Constitutional rights of Counsel to Equal Protection, U.S. 
Constitution, 14th Amendment, in that in denying attorney fees, it applies a separate and unequal 
standard for determining the reasonableness of fees for the legal profession and the medical 
- ~ - -
profession in their provisions of services to claimants. 
IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii requires attorneys to prove, inter alia, that their services 
"operated primarily or substantially" to obtain the desired result for claimants (worker'S 
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compensation benefits). But there is nothing in IDAPA 17.02.08.031 or elsewhere that requires 
medical providers to prove that their services "operated primarily or substantially" to obtain the 
desired result for claimant (medical recovery). Nor are medical providers required to prove that 
the claimant would not have recovered medically if the provider had not offered services. 
Counsel is aware of no authority to support the Commission's position that the legal 
profession and the medical profession should be subject to different, and arbitrary, standards for 
determining whether they should be paid for their provisions of services to claimants. This is a 
primafacie violation of Equal Protection under the law. 
THE ORDER FAILS TO PROVIDE REASONABLE NOTICE TO 
COUNSEL OF THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR ITS RULING, 
AND THE COMMISSION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH ITS OWN 
RULES REQUIRING NOTIFICATION OF REASONS FOR ITS 
FINDINGS 
The ORDER fails to provide reasonable notice to Counsel of the factual and legal basis 
for denying attorney fees to Counsel. The Idaho Supreme in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 
P.2d 132 (1993) has stated as follows: 
To properly review an order of the Commission under the appropriate standard of 
review, it is essential that the order of the Commission be based upon reviewable 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Iverson v. Farming, 103 Idaho 527, 530, 
650 P.2d 669, 672 (1982) ... Curr, 124 Idaho at 136, 864 P.2d at 690. 
Findings which are created after a decision has been made and entered are not the 
"findings" contemplated by our decisions ... Curr, 124 Idaho at 137, 864 P.2d at 
691. 
In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public 
welfare, the-Commission must-afford -due process-to the contracting parties, i.e., 
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493. The notice requirement mandates meaningful 
notification of the regulations to be imposed. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105 
S.Ct. at 1495. This means, at a minimum, that the Commission must give notice 
of the purpose of the hearing, must have clearly articulated evidentiary standards 
that will be used at the hearing, assign the burden of proof and level of proof, and 
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formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base the fee modifications in 
order to eliminate any latent arbitrariness. The "meaningful hearing" component 
of the due process requirement insures the attorney the opportunity to influence 
the discretion of the decision-maker by presenting his or her reasons "why the 
proposed action should not be taken" before the Commission makes the decision 
to modify the fee agreement. Id See also, Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 854 
P.2d 242 (1993). (emphasis in original) Curr, 124 Idaho at 138, 864 P.2d at 692. 
The above language, and the import of the Curr decision as a whole, makes clear the 
Court's position that notice, findings of fact, and conclusions of law are essential to fundamental 
fairness in making attorney fee rulings. 
In addition, Counsel never received any notification "in writing" of ''the reasons for the 
determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," even though this is required by IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.03.a. 
Clearly, both the due-process notice requirements and IDAP A notice requirements have 
not been met. Accordingly, the ORDER should be reconsidered. 
Counsel anticipates the argument that the notice requirements set forth above are not 
necessary, because Counsel may move for a hearing pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.b 
(hereinafter "Hearing"), and the burden of proof is on Counsel to prove at the Hearing that he 
acted reasonably, pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.d.4 However, the Commission has already 
ruled that Counsel's claims are unreasonable. So in reality, the purpose of any Hearing is to 
address the findings of unreasonableness that the Commission has already made. But how can 
Counsel address these findings ifhe doesn't have notice of what they are? 
To illustrate, let us consider this example: A Doctor begins treating a Patient in May 
2007, finishes the treatment two years later, and turns in his bill to the Insurance Adjuster 
responsible for paying it. The Adjuster decides that it finds the Doctor's bill to be unreasonable, 
4 "The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his or her assertion of a 
charging lien and reasonableness ofhis or her fee." IDAPA 17.02.0S.033.03.d. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. MOTION TO RECONSDER THE ORDER APPROVING IN PART PAGE 15 OF 18 
:~:'I='kS:;t STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT ET SEQ.; AND MEMO IN 
(208) 345-1000 SUPPORT 
and sends him a letter that says the Adjuster has already made up its mind against him. "I won't 
tell you in what respect your bill is unreasonable," the Adjuster says to the Doctor. "However, I 
will hold a meeting at which you can try to guess what I think you did wrong. If you can 
correctly guess what facts I relied on in previously making up my mind against you, and what 
law or constitutional principles I applied to those facts in making up my mind, and if you can 
also guess what proof I'd like to see before considering whether to change my mind, and if you 
can have had the prescience to have brought your proof to the meeting, then I'll be glad to hear 
you out. But be forewarned, the burden is on you to change my mind, and if you guess wrong, 
then I won't allow you to get paid for the work you did." 
Most people would agree that this approach does not seem fair to the Doctor. 
Let us continue the illustration. The Adjuster next says, "I'm not a doctor myself, but I 
think the Patient would have gotten well even if you hadn't helped him. So when we have our 
little meeting, you'll also have to prove that the Patient would not have gotten well without your 
help." 
Finally, the Adjuster says, "Keep in mind that it doesn't matter to me that the Patient got 
well, and that the Patient appreciates your efforts to cure him, and that the Patient agreed in 
advance to pay you, and that the Patient wants you to be paid for curing him." 
As this illustration shows, it is patently unfair to expect Counsel to put on proof to 
countermand the ruling that the Commission has already made against him, without Counsel 
having any notice as to the factual or legal basis for that ruling. 5 
5 Note that IDAPA Rule 17.02.08.033.03.b does nothing more than allow the Commission to change its ruling after 
a Hearing. Note also that in terms offairness, this Hearing procedure is to be distinguished from a process in which 
a tnbunal (that has not yet made a ruling) holds a hearing, takes evidence from all interested parties, quizzes the 
parties on their application of the law to the evidence, allows the parties to submit post-hearing briefs on the issues 
raised by the tribunal, and subsequently makes a ruling. 
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THE COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ITS 
IDAPA RULES IS CONTRARY TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 
The Commission's interpretation and application of its IDAP A rules in this case has led 
to results that are contrary to the legislative intent of "sure and certain relief for injured 
workmen" (I.C. 72-201) in enacting the worker's compensation law, and contrary to the 
delegation of power under I.C. 72-508 to "promulgate reasonable rules and regulations for 
effecting the purposes of this act." 
The Commission's action in this case is also contrary to public policy in that it is likely to 
damage the attorney-client relationship6, and contrary to public policy that favors ensuring that 
claimants have access to counsee. 
Counsel submits that neither the Idaho Legislature nor the Idaho Supreme Court has ever 
intended, nor would public policy favor, depriving Idaho's injured workers of their constitutional 
right to seek the advice and advocacy of counsel at every stage of a worker's compensation 
matter. 
Moreover, injured workers who do not receive their full medical and income benefits 
due to lack of access to legal counsel do not just disappear; they still need help, so they surface at 
emergency rooms for medical care and welfare departments for income problems. The net cost to 
society is same-it is just that the cost of caring for injured workers is shifted from insurance 
companies who are protected from having to pay on policy claims (even though they collected 
premiums) to other governmental and charitable institutions. This shifting of the cost is also 
counter to public policy. 
6 " ••• the Commission's arbitrary actions made suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes of their clients, thereby 
seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship ... " Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,692,864 P.2d 132, 138 
7 The Curr Court noted that "two general philosophies for the Commission to consider" are to "encourage claimants 
to pursue rightful legal claims and attorneys to take on such claimants' interests. Hogaboom, 107 Idaho at 17,684 
P.2d at 994." Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,693,864 Pold 132, 139 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the ORDER should be amended to approve inJull the 
"Stipulation and Agreement and Release and Lump Sum Settlement" that was the subject matter 
of the original ORDER, including approval of Counsel's attorney fees as set forth in said Lump 
Sum Settlement Agreement. 
Dated September 18, 2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
And 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
IN REGARD TO THE ORDER 
APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION 
AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT; 
AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION 
COJ\.1ES NOW Claimant's Counsel, and hereby moves the Commission to issue Findings 
and Fact and Conclusions of Law in regard to its ORDER APPROVING IN PART 
STIPULATION AND AGREEJ\.1ENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEJ\.1ENT filed 
September 4,2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"), and also hereby files Counsel's Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Motion. 
The basis for this motion is that Counsel is not aware of any facts, any documents, or any 
witness testimony that would support a finding that Counsel's fees were unreasonable, as set 
forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh attached hereto as Exhibit A. In addition, Counsel is not 
aware of any Constitutional or statutory basis that would support a finding that Counsel's fees 
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Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
IN REGARD TO THE ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION 
AND AGREEMENT ET SEQ.; AND MEMO IN SUPPORT 
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were unreasonable. In addition, Counsel never received any notification "in writing" of "the 
reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," as required by IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.03.a. 
In order for Counsel to prepare for a hearing on the ORDER (a motion for which is being 
separately filed with the Commission), Counsel must have notice of what facts the Commission 
relied upon in making its determination of unreasonableness; what facts are at issue; what 
documents to offer into evidence; what witnesses to call to testify; what law the Commission 
applied to said facts; and what conclusions of law the Commission made. Otherwise, Counsel is 
unable to prepare the factual and legal elements necessary to have a fair opportunity to be heard 
at a hearing on the ORDER. 
The relief sought is the issuance by the Commission of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as described herein. 
:MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FACTS 
COUNSEL'S ACTIONS HAVE BEEN REASONABLE 
Counsel represented Claimant in the above-captioned matter. In the representation, 
including Counsel's claims for attorney fees, Counsel was in full compliance with his legal, 
professional, and ethical obligations, all as set forth in the Idaho Constitution, Idaho statutes, 
Idaho rules, and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct including Rule 1.5 regarding attorney 
fees. Counsel was also in full compliance with Counsel's legal, professional, and ethical 
obligations under the fee and engagement contract executed by Claimant for Counsel's services. 
See Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, attached to the foregoing Motion as Exhibit A. 
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In sum, Counsel has not committed any acts or omissions that were unreasonable. 
THE COMMISSION HAS RULED THAT COUNSEL ACTED 
UNREASONABLY 
On September 4, 2009, the Commission issued its order titled ORDER APPROVING IN 
PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
(hereinafter "ORDER"). The ORDER states that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to 
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAP A 17.02.08.033." 
The ORDER also states that "Claimant's attorney [has] previously been advised in 
writing of this determination and his right to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees," an 
apparent reference to a letter to Counsel dated 9/3/09 from Scott McDougal, Manager of the 
Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission (attached hereto as Exhibit B). The letter states 
that a "portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum 
Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per IDAP A 17.02.08.033." 
In sum, the Commission has already ruled that Counsel acted unreasonably. 
ISSUES AND DISCUSSION 
DOES THE CONSTITUTION AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
REQUIRE THAT COUNSEL HAVE NOTICE OF THE FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELIED UPON BY THE COMMISSION? 
Having received the ORDER, Counsel is filing (under separate cover) a motion for a 
hearing on said ORDER pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.b (hereinafter "Hearing"). 
In terms of preparing for the Hearing, Counsel is unable to determine what witnesses to 
call and what evidence to introduce, because Counsel has not acted unreasonably and is not 
aware of any facts that suggest otherwise. Counsel is also unable to prepare an effective 
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Memorandum of Law in anticipation of the Hearing, because Counsel is not aware of any 
Constitutional or statutory basis for the Commission's findings in the ORDER.l 
Accordingly, it is clear that fundamental fairness requires that Counsel be informed by 
the tribunal, in advance of the Hearing, what facts and what law the tribunal relied upon in 
finding that Counsel acted unreasonably, so that Counsel may address these issues at the 
Hearing. 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,864 P.2d 132 (1993) has 
stated as follows: 
To properly review an order of the Commission under the appropriate standard of 
review, it is essential that the order of the Commission be based upon reviewable 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Iverson v. Farming, 103 Idaho 527, 530, 
650 P.2d 669,672 (1982) ... Curr, 124 Idaho at 136, 864 P.2d at 690. 
Findings which are created after a decision has been made and entered are not the 
"findings" contemplated by our decisions ... Curr, 124 Idaho at 137, 864 P.2d at 
691. 
In order to justifiably modify attorney fee agreements in the interest of public 
welfare, the Commission must afford due process to the contracting parties, i.e., 
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493. The notice requirement mandates meaningful 
notification of the regulations to be imposed. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105 
S.Ct. at 1495. This means, at a mjnjmum, that the Commission must give notice 
of the purpose of the hearing, must have clearly articulated evidentiary standards 
that will be used at the hearing, assign the burden of proof and level of proof, and 
formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base the fee modifications in 
order to eliminate any latent arbitrariness. The "meaningful hearing" component 
of the due process requirement insures the attorney the opportunity to influence 
the discretion of the decision-maker by presenting his or her reasons ''why the 
proposed action should not be taken" before the Commission makes the decision 
to modify the fee agreement. Id. See also, Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 854 
P.2d 242 (1993). (emphasis in original) Curr, 124 Idaho at 138, 864 P.2d at 692. 
1 As noted above, Counsel never received any notification "in writing" of "the reasons for the determination that the 
requested fee is not reasonable," even though this is required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.a. 
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The above language, and the import of the Curr decision as a whole, makes clear the 
Court's position that notice, an opportunity to be heard, findings of fact, and conclusions of law 
are essential to constitutional compliance and fundamental fairness in making attorney fee 
rulings. 
Counsel anticipates the argument that the burden of proof is on Counsel to prove at the 
Hearing that he acted reasonably, pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.d? However, the 
Commission has already ruled that Counsel's claims are unreasonable. So in reality, the purpose 
of this Hearing is to address the findings of unreasonableness that the Commission has already 
made. But how can Counsel address these findings ifhe doesn't know what they are? 
To illustrate, let us consider this example: A Doctor begins treating a Patient in May 
2007, finishes the treatment two years later, and turns in his bill to the Insurance Adjuster 
responsible for paying it. The Adjuster decides that it finds the Doctor's bill to be unreasonable, 
and sends him a letter that says the Adjuster has already made up its mind against him. "I won't 
tell you in what respect your bill is unreasonable," the Adjuster says to the Doctor. "However, 1 
will hold a meeting at which you can try to guess what 1 think you did wrong. If you can 
correctly guess what facts 1 relied on in previously making up my mind against you, and what 
law or constitutional principles 1 applied to those facts in making up my mind, and if you can 
also guess what proof I'd like to see before considering whether to change my mind, and if you 
can have had the prescience to have brought your proof to the meeting, then I'll be glad to hear 
you out. But be forewarned, the burden is on you to change my mind, and if you guess wrong, 
then 1 won't allow you to get paid for the work you did." 
Most people would agree that this approach does not seem fair to the Doctor. 
2 "The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his or her assertion of a 
charging lien and reasonableness ofhis or her fee." IDAPA 17.02.0S.033.03.d 
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Let us continue the illustration. The Adjuster next says, "I'm not a doctor myself, but I 
think the Patient would have gotten well even if you hadn't helped him. So when we have our 
little meeting, you'll also have to prove that the Patient would not have gotten well without your 
help." 
Finally, the Adjuster says, "Keep in mind that it doesn't matter to me that the Patient got 
well, and that the Patient appreciates your efforts to cure him, and that the Patient agreed in 
advance to pay you, and that the Patient wants you to be paid for curing him." 
As this illustration shows, it would be patently unfair to expect Counsel to put on proof to 
countermand the ruling that the Commission has already made against him, without Counsel 
having any information as to the factual or legal basis for that ruling. 3 
WHEN AN ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS PRIMA FACIE 
INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT, DOES FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
REQUIRE THAT COUNSEL HAVE NOTICE OF THE FACTS AND LAW 
RELIED UPON BY THE COMMISSION? 
To recap, the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA) provides for benefits for 
Permanent Partial Disability of$6215.00 and Lump Sum Consideration of$12,223.13 for 
"decreased wage earning capacity, non-medical factors and permanent partial disability, if any." 
See Page 5 of the LSSA, which is attached to the ORDER. See also the chart titled "Kulm 
Benefits and Fees," attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
The ORDER does not allow Counsel to receive attorney fees on the permanent partial 
disability that is contained in the line item of the $6215.00 (hereinafter "Unreasonable PPD"), 
but it does allow fees on the permanent partial disability that is contained in the line item of the 
3 Note that IDAPA Rule 17.02.08.033.03.b does nothing more than allow the Commission to change its ruling after 
a Hearing. Note also that in terms of fairness, this Hearing procedure is to be distinguished from a process in which 
a tribunal (that has not yet made a ruling) holds a hearing, takes evidence from all interested parties, quizzes the 
parties on their application of the law to the evidence, allows the parties to submit post-hearing briefs on the issues 
raised by the tribunal, and subsequently makes a ruling. 
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$12,223.13 (hereinafter "Reasonable PPD"). In other words, the Commission ruled that it was 
reasonable for Counsel to claim attorney fees on some portions of the permanent partial disability 
benefits but not on others. The ORDER gives no clue for the differing treatment. 
This ruling was made despite the fact that there is no dispute that all PPD benefits were 
obtained as a direct result of Counsel obtaining a vocational evaluation report from Dr. Mary 
Barros-Bailey and sending her findings of disability beyond impairment to the surety along with 
a demand for PPD benefits. After receiving the demand, the surety ultimately began making PPD 
payments, months before settlement was reached. 
The attorney's fee ruled to be unreasonable totals $3,301.72, which amount was 
itemized4 in the AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW filed with the Commission on July 24,2009, in paragraph 8: "The benefits paid prior 
to Lump Sum Settlement (listed in my Form 1022) include PPI benefits of $7768.75, on which 
attorney fees of$1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of $5438.13, on which attorney fees of 
$1359.53 were paid (see demand letters to the surety dated 9118/08 and 9/28/08, attached hereto 
as Exhibit[ s D." 
Counsel can hazard no guess as to why the Commission ruled that it was not reasonable 
to claim attorney fees on some PPD benefits but not others, given that both the "Unreasonable 
PPD" and the "Reasonable PPD" resulted from the exact same advocacy efforts of Counsel. 
One might argue that the Commission simply made a mistake-that it got confused and 
assumed that all of the $3,301.72 in unreasonable fees was on the permanent partial impairment 
benefits, when in fact only $1942.19 in fees was claimed on PPI. Counsel considers the mistake 
theory to be unlikely for these reasons: 
4 Inexplicably, the ORDER on page 1 characterizes the $3,301.72 as ''un-itemized'' by Counsel. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA. MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
942 W. Myrtle Street 0 ING N 
Boise, Idaho 83702 IN REGARD T THE ORDER APPROV I PART STIPULATION 
PAGE? OF 10 
(208) 345-1000 AND AGREEMENT ET SEQ.; AND MEMO IN SUPPORT 
• The Commission was aware that the PPI rating was only 5%; that this percentage 
translated to benefits of $7,768.75; and that a claim of$3,301.72 on that amount 
would equal an attorney's fee ofa whopping 42.5%. 
• The Commission had received on July 24, 2009 the above-referenced AFFIDAVIT 
OF ANDREW C. MARSH, which contained the above-referenced itemization in 
paragraph 8, and which contained exhibits of the demand letters for PPD benefits that 
resulted in the surety starting to pay PPD benefits many months before a settlement 
agreement was even reached. 
• The Commission's ORDER says it issued the order only after "Having fully reviewed 
the proposed settlement and being fully advised." 
• The above-referenced letter from Mr. McDougal emphasizes that the Commission 
"considered your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12." 
Clearly, then, it was no mistake that the Commission ruled that an attorney fee claim on 
some of the PPD benefits was reasonable and some of it was unreasonable. In other words, the 
Commission's ruling was made knowingly and purposefully, and had to have been based on 
some fact or some aspect of law. In order for Counsel to address at Hearing the differing bases 
for the PPD ruling, Counsel would need to be informed what those bases were. 
In sum, it would be patently unfair to expect Counsel to put on proof to countermand the 
ruling that the Commission has already made as to PPD claims, without Counsel having any 
information as to the factual or legal basis for that ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission and Mr. McDougal have acknowledged in writing that they have 
received and reviewed the evidence of the services that Counsel performed for Claimant, the 
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contractual basis for so performing, and the hundreds of pages of exhibits that further evidence 
those services. The situation can be summarized thusly: 
• Counsel has already placed on file with the Commission overwhelming evidence as to 
legal work performed, and believes he has met his burden of proof of the reasonableness 
of his claims for attorney fees. 
• The Commission has already reviewed that evidence, and has already ruled that the 
attorney fees were unreasonable. 
• Counsel needs to know the [mdings of fact and conclusions of law relied upon by the 
Commission in making the rulings contained in its ORDER, so that it may address these 
at the Hearing (which is expected to be held pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.b.). 
• At the Hearing, Counsel needs to make a record of the facts relied upon by the 
Commission for its ORDER, for purposes of preserving its rights to appeal. 
• At the Hearing, Counsel needs to make a record of the conclusions oflaw reached by the 
Commission for its ORDER, for purposes of preserving its rights to appeal. 
Without a full and fair opportunity to make a record at the Hearing, Counsel will be 
irreparably prejudiced in any appeal. The Commission should enter findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw as to its ORDER so that Counsel will have a fair opportunity to challenge 
these at the Hearing and to make a record for appeal. 
Dated September 18,2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
.l .I /._ j 
....,.,~- /.J~ ... -
Andrew Marsh 
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Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Ada ) 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., and attorney of 
record for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. I have represented Claimant in the above matter since on or about 5/30/2007. 
3. I have received and reviewed the Commission's ORDER APPROVING IN PART 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT filed 
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September 4, 2009 in the above-captioned matter (hereinafter "ORDER"), including the 
Commission's findings in said ORDER that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to the 
Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAP A 17.02.08.033." 
4. I have received and reviewed a letter dated 9/3/09 from Scott McDougal, 
Manager of the Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission, including his statement that a 
"portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum 
Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033." Said letter 
does not set forth "the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," as 
required by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.a. 
5. In my representation of Claimant, including my claims for attorney fees, I have 
been in full compliance with my legal, professional, and ethical obligations, all as set forth in the 
Idaho Constitution, Idaho statutes, Idaho rules, and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
including Rule 1.5 regarding attorney fees. 
6. In my representation of Claimant, including my claims for attorney fees, I have 
been in full compliance with my legal, professional, and ethical obligations under the fee and 
engagement contract executed by Claimant for my services. 
7. I am not aware of any facts, any documents, or any witness testimony that would 
support a finding that my claim for attorney fees is unreasonable. 
8. In any communications that I have had from the Commission, Mr. McDougal, or 
Sharon Delanoy of the Commission's staff, I have not been made aware of any facts, any 
documents, or any witness testimony that would support a finding that my claim for attorney fees 
is unreasonable. 
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9. I am not aware of the Constitutional or statutory basis for the Commission's 
fmding that my claim for attorney fees is unreasonable, and consequently, I am not aware of the 
conclusions of law that the Commission made or the facts to which it applied its conclusions. 
10. Without more information as to the facts, documents, and witness testimony that 
the Commission relied upon in finding that my claim to be unreasonable, and without any notice 
of the conclusions of law made by the Commission, I am unable to prepare the factual and legal 
elements necessary to participate at a hearing on the ORDER. 
11. Adding to my lack of information on how to prepare for said hearing is the fact 
that the ORDER states that "Attorney has previously withheld $3,301.72 as fees, un-itemized as 
to the specific benefits obtained other than "Benefits, paid prior to Lump Sum ... "." However, I 
filed my Affidavit with the Commission on July 24,2009 (which the Commission considered, 
according to Mr. McDougal's letter to me) which contains the following itemization in paragraph 
8: "The benefits paid prior to Lump Sum Settlement (listed in my Form 1022) include PPI 
benefits of $7768.75, on which attorney fees of$1942.19 were paid, and PPD benefits of 
$5438.13, on which attorney fees of $1359.53 were paid." Accordingly, I do not know what 
itemization the Commission considers to be lacking. 
12. As I noted in my MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022 
filed with the Commission on July 24, 2009, I am aware of recent rulings by the Commission 
denying an attorney's right to receive attorney fees on permanent partial impairment (pPI) 
benefits. However, in the instant case, the ORDER found that it was unreasonable for me to 
receive attorney fees of$1359.53 on permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits of$5438.13 (as 
set forth in my July 24, 2009 Affidavit quoted in the previous paragraph), which benefits I had 
obtained for my client beginning some six months prior to reaching an agreement for lump sum 
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settlement. I cannot conceive of any facts or circumstances that would have led the Commission 
to conclude that claiming attorney fees on P P D benefits obtained for a Claimant is unreasonable 
(especially since the same ORDER allows attorney fees on other PPD benefits, and the factual 
basis for both sets ofPPDs is one and the same), and therefore I am unable to prepare the factual 
and legal elements necessary to address the Commission's finding in regard to fees on PPD 
benefits. 
FURTHER SA YETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
Dated September 18,2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on September 18,2009. 
W~ D· We-J::C-CiL 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
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Notary Public for Idaho 
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C.L "BurcH" 0'n'ER, GOVERNOR 
September 3,2009 
Andrew Marsh 
Seiniger Law Office 
942 W Myrtle ' 
Boise, ID 83702 
Re: Claimant: Laurel Kulm 
Ie #: 2006-012770 
PO Box. 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
(208)334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321 
1-800-950-2110 
Proposed settlement with Indemnity Insurance Company of America 
Dear Mr. Marsh: 
COMMISSIONERS 
R.O. Maynard. o.irman 
Thomas E. Limbaugh 
'I'bonw P. Baskin 
MiDdy Montpncry. Oircctor 
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed settlement agreement 
referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also considered 
your letters and attachments of May 5, July 24, and August 12 regarding your representation of 
the claimant and your proposed fees. The Commission staffhas made an initial determination 
that the settlement is in the best interests of the parties, except for the portion of the requested 
fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum Consideration, which have not 
been found to be reasonable per IDAP A 17.02.08.033. 
Please be aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in 
accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing 
available funds, and fees which have been determined to be reasonable. 
Thank you for your assistance in the review of this proposed settlement 
Scott McDougall 
Manager, Claims and Benefits 
700 So. Clearwater Ln., Boi5c, ID 
Equal Opportunity Employcr 
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WM. BRECK SEINIGER,JR. 
Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia 
JULIE MARsH SEINIGER 
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia 
September 19,2009 
A.'IDREW C. MARsH 
Idaho, Indiana, and Missofl!i 
VIA EMAIL TOpurdue2you@msn.com 
And VIA U.S. MAIL 
Laurel Kulm 
2090 A venida de las Alturas 
Santa Fe, NM 87505 
RE: Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center 
Dear Laurel: 
This is in follow-up to the Skype conversation you had with Breck and me on or about 
September 11,2009. As you know, we have inquired if you would be interested in 
executing an affidavit in support of our claim of attorney's fees on the permanent partial 
impairment (PPI) rating benefits, and on a portion of the permanent partial disability 
(PPD) benefits, paid on the injury that is the subject of your worker's compensation case 
before the Idaho Industrial Commission in which we are representing you. 
The amount involved is $3301.72, which is the amount of attorney fees that the Industrial 
Commission ruled in its Order filed 9/4/09 to have not been substantiated as reasonable. 
(The Order was emailed to you earlier.) 
Unless the Commission or an appellate court changes the Order, you will receive the 
additional sum of $3301.72, instead of that sum being awarded to us for attorney fees. 
(Of course, regardless of this issue you will still also receive the $9740.00 as set forth in 
the Lump Sum Agreement you signed.) 
This raises a conflict of interest on our part, in that it is against your [mandaI interest to 
support our claim for these attorneys' fees. I have attached a copy ofIdaho Rule of 
Profession Conduct 1.7 and its Commentary for your review, which addresses conflicts of 
interest between clients and lawyers (which can arise from the lawyer's own interests as 
mentioned in Commentary [1 D. You can go to the following web site to review the rules 
of ethics, from which I copied the attached rule: 
http://isb.idaho . gov / general/rules/irpc .html. 
A lawyer has an obligation to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Therefore, 
during the phone conversation we had last week, we advised you of certain things that 
942 W. MYRTIE STREET (208) 345-1000 Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com 
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will be included in your affidavit concerning this conflict of interest if you elect to waive 
any conflict of interest and file an affidavit in support of our claim for attorneys fees on 
the PPI and PPD benefits obtained for you for your injury. The proposed affidavit will be 
sent to you under separate cover. 
If, after reviewing the attached, you still wish to file an affidavit in support of our motion 
for attorney fees, I request that you sign the attached waiver and return it to me. Again, 
you have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or sign an affidavit supporting our 
claim for those attorney's fees. Thank you. 
Andrew Marsh 
P.S. You may scan and email your signed waiver, or you may fax it to our temporary fax 
number of 208-433-9727. In any event, please also mail an original of your signature to 
us. Thank you. 
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RULE 1.7: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a c!ient if the representation involves a 
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by 
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by the personal 
interests of the lawyer, including family and domestic relationships. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may 
represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client 
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
Commentary 
General Principles 
[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent 
conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from 
the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest. see Rule 1.8. For former 
client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For 
definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(e) and (b). 
[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or 
clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite 
the existence of a conflict, Le., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under 
paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include 
both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially 
limited under paragraph (a)(2). 
[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be 
declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To 
determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and 
type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See 
also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer'S violation 
of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see 
Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope. 
[4] If a confiict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the 
representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). 
See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is 
determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to 
represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also 
Comments [5] and [29]. 
[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or 
realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the 
lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on 
the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the 
conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 
1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has 
withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c). 
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Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse 
[6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that clienfs 
informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer 
represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is 
directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the 
lawyer's ability to represent the client effectlvely. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is 
undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that c1ienfs case less effectlvely out of deference to the other 
client. i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. 
Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a 
witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in 
the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only 
economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not 
ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respectlve clients. 
[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent 
the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transactlon but in another, 
unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client. 
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation 
[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's 
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the dient will be materially limited as a 
result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals 
seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible 
positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses 
altematives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself 
require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if 
it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering altematives 
or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client 
Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons 
[9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially 
limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as 
fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director. 
Personal Interest Conflicts 
[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For 
example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for 
the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions conceming possible employment 
with an opponent of the lawyer's client. or with a law firm representing the opponent. such discussions could materially 
limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect 
representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. 
See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactlons with 
clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law 
firm). 
[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related 
by blood, marriage or other domestic relationship, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed 
and that the lawyer's domestic relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a 
result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the 
lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to-another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling, 
spouse or domestic partner, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another 
party, unless each dient gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a dose family or domestic relationship 
is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10. 
[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates 
the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j). 
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Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service 
[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-cIient, if the client is informed of that 
fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the 
client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a Significant risk that the lawyer's 
representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the 
lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer wiho is also a co-cIient, then the lawyer must comply with the 
requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining wihether the conflict is 
consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation. 
Prohibited Representations 
[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph 
(b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot property ask for sudh agreement or 
provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. \Nhen the lawyer is representing more than one client, the 
question of consentability must be resolved as to eadh client. 
[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering wihether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected 
if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under 
paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the 
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence). 
[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable 
law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one 
defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain 
representations by a former govemment lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In 
addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, sudh as a municipality, to consent to a 
conflict of interest. 
[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous 
development of eadh client's position wihen the clients are aligned directly against eadh other in the same litigation or 
other proceeding before a tribunal. \Nhether clients are aligned directly against eadh other within the meaning of this 
paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's 
multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under 
Rule 1.0(m», sudh representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1). 
Informed Consent 
[18] Informed consent requires that eadh affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material 
and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 
1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks 
involved. \Nhen representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the 
implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client 
privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on 
confidentiality). 
[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, 
wihen the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure 
necessary to permit the other client to make an informed deCision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In 
some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation 
with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, 
are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining wihether common representation is in the client's 
interests. 
Consent Confirmed in Writing 
[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a 
writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the 
client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is 
not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or 
transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need 
in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened 
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with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available altematives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to 
consider the risks and altematives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress 
upon clients the seriousness of the deciSion the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that 
might later occur in the absence of a writing. 
Revoking Consent 
[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the 
lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer 
from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the 
client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client 
and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result. 
Consent to Future Conflict 
[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test 
of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably 
understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future 
representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those 
representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to 
consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective 
with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be 
ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other 
hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that 
a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented 
by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the 
representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are 
such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b). 
Conflicts in Litigation 
[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' 
consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as 
coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in 
the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing parly or the fact that there are substantially 
different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well 
as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that 
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of 
persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met. 
[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different 
clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the 
interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of 
interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the 
lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client 
will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in 
determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is 
substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate 
and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is 
significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of 
the representations or withdraw from one or both matters. 
[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, 
unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying 
paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before 
representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a 
class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an 
unrelated matter. 
Nonlitigation Conflicts 
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[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of 
directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is 
significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or 
clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely 
prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8]. 
[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called 
upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a 
conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a 
particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, 
including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's 
relationship to the parties involved. 
[28] Vv'hether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple 
parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is 
permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among 
them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually 
advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, 
working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a 
property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing 
the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of 
incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer 
that the lawyer act for all of them. 
Special Considerations in Common Representation 
[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the 
common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional 
cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the 
clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is 
plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation 
or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial 
between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality 
can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility 
that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors 
are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continUing basis and whether the situation involves 
creating or terminating a relationship between the parties. 
[30] A particulariy important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-
lawyer confidentiality and the attorneY-Client privilege. \iVith regard to the attomey-client privilege, the prevailing rule is 
that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation 
eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so 
advised. 
[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one 
client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so 
because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each Client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything 
bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that 
information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as 
part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that 
the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from 
the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the 
clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, 
the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely 
affect representation involving a jOint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the 
informed consent of both clients. 
[32] Vv'hen seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's 
role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to 
assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope 
of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at 
the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2( c). 
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent 
representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to 
discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16. 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 







[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not. by virtue of that representation. necessarily 
represent any constituent or affiliated organization. such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus. the lawyer 
for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter. unless the 
circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer. there is an understanding 
between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates. 
or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's 
representation of the other client. 
[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine 
whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in 
matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may 
arise. the potential intensity of the conflict. the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the 
corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will 
compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment. the lawyer should not serve as a director or should 
cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of 
the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of 
director might not be protected by the attomey-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the 
lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation 
in a matter. 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
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September 19, 2009 
Page 90/9 
WAIVER OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
I have read the foregoing letter dated September 19, 2009 and the foregoing ethics Rule 
1.7. I understand the nature and extent of the conflict of interest that Seiniger Law 
Offices, P.A. has in regard to the attorney fee issue in my worker's compensation case 
titled Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center. 
I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72 
to support their claim for attorney fees. I knowingly and voluntarily elect to waive the 
conflict of interest. 
I understand that I have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or to sign an 
affidavit supporting the claim of Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. for attorney's fees. 
I have had an opportunity to discuss this issue with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. to my 
satisfaction. I also understand that I have the right to consult with separate legal counsel 
before signing this waiver or before signing any affidavit. 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAw OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
.Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 




LC. No. 06-012770 
Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
and 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STAre OF /J.ov.J HM~ 




Laurel Kulm, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. I was inj ured in my workplace on or about November 2, 2006. At the time I was working 
as a sleep technologist. In years past, I had worked as a paralegal, among other things. 
3. I retained Seiniger Law Offices, P.A (hereinafter "Counsel") to represent me in the 
above-entitled matter. I signed a CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT IN A 
S8N1GER LAW OFFICES, P A 
942 W. Myrtle street 
Boise, Idaho 63702 
(200) 34& 1(XXl 
AFFIDAVIT Qf LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF C~S COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOil A TI.l'jtNEY FEES 
PAGE 1 oF4 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE (hereinafter "FEE AGREEMENT'). dated June 
1,2007. 
4. I read and ooderstood the FEE AGREEMENT before I signed it. I had an opportunity to 
discuss its terms with Counsel before signing. I understood that Co\ID.Sel was going to 
receive an attorney fee on any benefits that were received after representation began, 
including benefits from a permanent partial impairment rating (PPI) and benefits from a 
finding of permanent partial disability (PPD), if any. 
5. Prior to retaining Counsel, my employer and its surety had not guaranteed any benefits to 
me. 
6. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know if! would have any permanent impairment. No 
doctor had said to me that I would, or would not, have any permanent impairment 
7. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know if I would have any permanent work 
restrictions from my injury. 
8. Prior to retaining CO\ID.Sel, I did not know if! would have any permanent partial 
disability. mtimately, my Counsel sent me for a vocational evaluation by Dr. Mary 
Barros-Bailey, who made a finding ofPPD. 
9. I sought to retain an attorney for several reasons, including: I felt that I was getting the 
run-around from the worker's compensation adjuster; I had been told that I might not 
have a case; I had been told that my injury might not be covered because it was pre--
existing from degenerative disease; I wanted to know what my legal rights were; I wanted 
advice on what to do; I wanted the other side to know that I was represented; and I 
wanted an attorney to fight for me. 1 believed that I was getting pushed around bec1UlS6 I, 
did not have a lawyer. 
SBNlGER LAW OFFICES, P A 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 93702 
(208) 345-1000 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
PAGE20F4 
10. In signing the FEE AGREEMENT, I understood that I was agreeing to pay a contingent 
fee on PPI benefits even if the benefits turned out to be uncontested. but it was worth it to 
me because I wanted to have an attorney to act as my legal counselor and as my advoCate. 
11. I could not have afforded to pay an attorney on an hourly fee basis. 
12. I have received and reviewed the Industrial Commission's ORDER APPROVING IN 
PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT. RELEASE AND LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT filed September 4, 2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"), including the 
Commission's findings in the ORDER. that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to 
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033." I have also 
received and reviewed a letter dated September 3, 2009, from Scott McDougal, Manager 
of the Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission, including his statement that a 
"portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum 
Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per lDAPA 17.02.08.033." 
13. I do not agree with the above fmdings that the attorney fees being requested by my 
Counsel are not reasonable. As I have stated to my Counsel on several occasions, I 
believe that they did an excellent job for me on my case. 
14. I have not been consulted by the Commission or by Mr. McDougal on the issue of the 
reasonableness of the requested attorney fees or on the issue of whether I would like to 
have my FEE AGREEMENT with Counsel upheld 
15. I believe that I have a right to have my FEE AGREEMENT with my Counsel upheld apd 
I would like for it to be upheld, including my obligation to pay the agreed fee in full to 
Counsel for the services provided. 
sa NIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(203) 345-1000 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEV'S 
REQUEST FOR A'ITORNEY FEES 
PAGE 3 OF4 
16. I tmderstand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72 
to support my Counsel's claim to receive the requested attorney fees. Nonetheless, 1 
knowingly and voluntarily support their claim for attorney fees in full. 
FURTHER SA YETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT. 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public in and for the state of 
1Vw TvVX"lD , on this the :2..Jsf day of :kpkmber ,2009. 




. " " ." 
My Commission expires: Jet Y1 00.. r,/ !l q I 2.013 
S8NIGER lAW OFFICES, P A 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Bdse, Idaho 83702 
(200) 34&1000 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR A TIORNEY FEES 
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Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.e. No. 06-012770 
EX PARTE ORDER ALLOWING 
TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT 
This matter coming before the Commission upon the motion of Claimant's Counsel to 
permit Seiniger Law Offices to provide testimony or supplement testimony by way of affidavit in 
support of its claim for attorneys fees, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
By: 
On behalf of the Idaho Industrial Commission 
EX PARTE ORDER ALLOWING 
TF.STTMONV RV A FF1l)A VTT 
L\ COpy 




Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
EX PARTE ORDER ALLOWING 
TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT 
This matter coming before the Commission upon the motion of Claimant's Counsel to 
permit Seiniger Law Offices to provide testimony or supplement testimony by way of affidavit in 
support of its claim for attorneys fees, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
By: 
On behalf of the Idaho Industrial Commission 
EX PARTE ORDER ALLOWING 
rnSTTMONV RV A FFTOA VTT 
, 
1""\.f"\,,,,f\,1 i\ l 
UK' LJ \ \ \l r\ L. 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 




Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
MOTION TO ADD 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
AS AN EXHIBIT TO COUNSEL'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Claimant's counsel, and hereby moves this Commission to allow Counsel 
to add the AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES as an exhibit to Counsel's MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
that was previously filed with this Commission on September 18,2009. Said AFFIDAVIT is 
attached to the instant Motion as Exhibit A. The grounds for the instant Motion are that it is in 
the interests of justice for the Commission to consider the evidence contained in said 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM, in that Ms. Kulm is the Claimant in the above-captioned 
case and as such she has an interest in having her voice heard before the Commission makes its 
ruling on Counsel's MOTION TO RECONSIDER. Counsel submits that the instant Motion is 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MOTION TO ADD AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM PAGE 1 OF2 
AS AN EXHIBIT TO COUNSEL'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
being made \vithin the 20-day time period set forth in J.R.P. 3 (F) regarding motions to 
reconsider. The relief sought by this Motion is for the Commission to allow Counsel to add the 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEY FEES as an exhibit to Counsel's MOTION TO RECONSIDER that is already 
on file with this Commission. 
Dated September 24, 2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
~~~ Andr Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on September 24,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be served as follows: 
Alan Hull 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL 
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise ID 83707-7426 
Fax: (208) 344-5510 
[RJFax 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
An~1t~ 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MOTION TO ADD AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
AS AN EXHIBIT TO COUNSEL'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
PAGE 2 OF 2 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (rSB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (rSB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAw OFFICES, P.A 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attomeys for Claimant 




I.e. No. 06-012770 
Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
and 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF Uu-u 1--fJl4,~ 




Laurel Kulm, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
I. I am the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. I was injured in my workplace on or about November 2, 2006. At the time I was working 
as a sleep technologist. In years past, I had worked as a paralegal, among other things. 
3. r retained Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (hereinafter "Counsel") to represent me in the 
above-entitled matter. I signed a CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEtv.IENT IN A 
SEJNIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
AFFIDAVIT Qf LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CJ-AIMAl'IT'S COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR. ATTp~EY FEES 
"':' ' 
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WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE (hereinafter "FEE AGREEMENT"), dated Jlille 
1,2007. 
4. I read and understood the FEE AGREEMENT before I signed it. I had an opportunity to 
discuss its terms with Counsel before signing. I understood that Counsel was going to 
receive an attorney fee on any benefits that were received after representation began, 
including benefits from a permanent partial impairment rating (PPl) and benefits from a 
finding of permanent partial disability (PPD), if any. 
5. Prior to retaining Counsel, my employer and its surety had not guaranteed any benefits to 
me. 
6. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know in would have any permanent impairment. No 
doctor had said to me that I would, or would not, have any permanent impairment 
7. Prior to retaining COlillsel, I did not know if I would have any permanent work 
restrictions from my injury. 
8. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know in would have any permanent partial 
disability. Ultimately, my Counsel sent me for a vocational evaluation by Dr. Mary 
Barros-Bailey, who made a finding ofPPD. 
9. I sought to retain an attorney for several reasons, including: I felt that I was getting the 
run-around from the worker's compensation adjuster; I had been told that I might not 
have a case; I had been told that my injury might not be covered because it was pre-
existing from degenerative disease; I wanted to know what my legal rights were; I wanted 
advice on what to do; I wanted the other side to know that I was represented; and I 
wanted an attorney to fight for me. I believed that I was getting pushed arolilld because I 
did not have a lawyer. 
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345.1000 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
PAGE 2 OF 4 
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lO. In signing the FEE AGREEMENT, I understood that I was agreeing to pay a contingent 
fee on PPI benefits even if the benefits turned out to be uncontested, but it was worth it to 
me because I wanted to have an attorney to act as my legal counselor and as my advocate. 
11. I could not have afforded to pay an attorney on an hourly fee basis. 
12. I have received and reviewed the Industrial Commission's ORDER APPROVING IN 
PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AL~D LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT filed September 4,2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"), including the 
Commission's findings in the ORDER that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to 
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAP A 17.02.08.033." I have also 
received and reviewed a letter dated September 3, 2009, from Scott McDougal, Manager 
of the Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission, including his statement that a 
"portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223.13 Lump Sum 
Consideration ... have not been found to be reasonable per IDAP A 17.02.08.033." 
13. I do not agree with the above findings that the attorney fees being requested by my 
Counsel are not reasonable. As I have stated to my Counsel on several occasions, I 
believe that they did an excellent job for me on my case. 
14. I have not been consulted by the Commission or by Mr. McDougal on the issue of the 
reasonableness of the requested attorney fees or on the issue of whether I would like to 
have my FEE AGREEMENT with Counsel upheld 
15. I believe that I have a right to have my FEE AGREEMENT with my Counsel upheld and 
I would like for it to be upheld, including my obligation to pay the agreed fee in full to 
Counsel for the services provided. 
SElNIGERLAWOFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR AITORl'l'EY FEES 
PAGE 3 OF 4 
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16. I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72 
to support my Counsel's claim to receive the requested attorney fees. Nonetheless, I 
knowingly and voluntarily support their claim for attorney fees in full. 
FURTHER SA YETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGID. 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public in and for the state of ,Jew ,-vI-e;{I{ D 
Nf.iJJ \VVX fl C ,on this the :21$f day of '1e p km be c , 2009. t2~ 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 




My Commission expires: JClYtiJo.. y,/ ;Lq I Lul3 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
PAGE 4 OF 4 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SElNIGER. LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES 
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Mercy Medical Center, 
Em.ployer. 
and 
Industrial Claims Managemen~ 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.e. No, 06-012770 
MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO 
ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFIDA vrr 
PAGE (H/1!; 
COMES NOW Seiniger Law Offices, F.A., ClaimiUlt's Counsel, and hereby moves this 
Commission to enter the attached proposed ex parte order permitting Seinlger Law Offices to 
provide testimony or supplement testimony by way of affidavit in suppon of its claim for 
attorneys. Doing so will shorten the time for hearing by allowing Claimant'1) Counsel to create a 
record for the Coromi.ssions review of the facts to which member's of the rum CQuid testify and 
documents that could be iden.tified in. such testimony, but which would consume time. This 
motion is also based upon a desire to minimize the awkwardness of Claimant's Counsel having 
to e~am.ine themselves, though they will be present at hearing to be questioned by the 
Commission. This will also prevent the Claimant from having to travel from Same Fe, New 
S:EJNlG£Jt LA. W OFPlCR:S, P.A. 
!14.2 W. Myrtlt Strtel 
Boia., IdllOho S370l 
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ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFJDA VlT 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEIN1GER LAW OFFICES, P .A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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I.C. No. 06-012770 
MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO 
ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT 
Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., Claimant's Counsel, and hereby moves this 
Commission to enter the attached proposed ex parte order permitting Seiniger Law Offices to 
provide testimony or supplement testimony by way of affidavit in support of its claim for 
attorneys. Doing so will shorten the time for hearing by allowing Claimant's Counsel to create a 
record for the Commissions review of the facts to which member's of the fIrm could testify and 
documents that could be identifIed in such testimony, but which would consume time. This 
motion is also based upon a desire to minimize the awkwardness of Claimant's Counsel having 
to examine themselves, though they will be present at hearing to be questioned by the 
Commission. This will also prevent the Claimant from having to travel from Sante Fe, New 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(")n2\ U.c:_11\A1\ 
MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO 
ALLOW TESTIMONY BY AFFIDAVIT 
Pagel 
Mexico for the hearing, and Claimant's Counsel from having to call Defense Counsel as a 
witness thereby taking up his time unnecessarily. 
The Claimant does not contest Counsel's right to attorney fees as per the Affidavit of 
Laurel Kulm filed herewith and the signed waiver of conflict of interest. 
Dated November 3,2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
~r 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on November 3,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be served as follows: 
Alan Hull 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL 
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise ID 83707-7426 
Fax: (208) 344-5510 
akhull@ajhlaw.com 
Laurel Kulm 
2090 Avenida de las Alturas 
Santa Fe, NM 87505 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
{')OQ\ UC_1M1l 
MOTION FOR EX PARTE ORDER TO 




LA V'" 0 FFI CP'S 
ProjessilJnal Association 
WM. BRECK SEINIGER,JR. 
Idaho, O"'gon, Washington, and the District of Columbia 
JULIE MARsH SEINIGER 
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia 
September 19, 2009 
ANDREW C. MARsH 
Idaho, Indiana, and Missouri 
VIA EMAIL TOpurdue2you@msn.com 
And VIA U.S. MAIL 
Laurel Kulm 
2090 A venida de las Alturas 
Santa Fe, NM 87505 
RE: Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center 
Dear Laurel: 
This is in follow-up to the Skype conversation you had with Breck and me on or about 
September 11, 2009. As you know, we have inquired if you would be interested in 
executing an affidavit in support of our claim of attorney's fees on the permanent partial 
impairment (PP!) rating benefits, and on a portion of the permanent partial disability 
(PPD) benefits, paid on the injury that is the subject of your worker's compensation case 
before the Idaho Industrial Commission in which we are representing you. 
The amount involved is $3301.72, which is the amount of attorney fees that the Industrial 
Commission ruled in its Order filed 9/4/09 to have not been substantiated as reasonable. 
(The Order was emailed to you earlier.) 
Unless the Commission or an appellate court changes the Order, you will receive the 
additional sum of $3301.72, instead of that sum being awarded to us for attorney fees. 
(Of course, regardless of this issue you will still also receive the $9740.00 as set forth in 
the Lump Sum Agreement you signed.) 
This raises a conflict of interest on our part, in that it is against your fmancial interest to 
support our claim for these attorneys' fees. I have attached a copy ofIdaho Rule of 
Profession Conduct 1.7 and its Commentary for your review, which addresses conflicts of 
interest between clients and lawyers (which can arise from the lawyer's own interests as 
mentioned in Commentary [1 D. You can go to the following web site to review the rules 
of ethics, from which I copied the attached rule: 
http://isb.idaho.gov/generallrules/irpc.html. 
A lawyer has an obligation to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Therefore, 
during the phone conversation we had last week, we advised you of certain things that 
942 W. MYRTIE STREET (208) 345-1000 AndreW@SeinigerLaw.com 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 Fax: (208) 345-4700 www.SeinigerLaw.com 
ElCHIBIT_ A 
September 19,2009 
Page 2 0/9 
will be included in your affidavit concerning this conflict of interest if you elect to waive 
any conflict of interest and file an affidavit in support of our claim for attorneys fees on 
the PPI and PPD benefits obtained for you for your injury. The proposed affidavit will be 
sent to you under separate cover. 
If, after reviewing the attached, you still wish to file an affidavit in support of our motion 
for attorney fees, I request that you sign the attached waiver and return it to me. Again, 
you have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or sign an affidavit supporting our 
claim for those attorney's fees. Thank: you. 
Andrew Marsh 
P.S. You may scan and email your signed waiver, or you may fax it to our temporary fax 
number of208-433-9727. In any event, please also mail an original of your signature to 
us. Thank: you. 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 




Page 3 0/9 
RULE 1.7: CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b). a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a 
concurrent conflict of interest A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by 
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by the personal 
interests of the lawyer, including family and domestic relationships. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may 
represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client 
represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
Commentary 
General Principles 
[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent 
conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from 
the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former 
client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For 
definitions of "informed consent" and ·confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(e) and (b). 
[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or 
clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3} decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite 
the existence of a conflict, Le., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under 
paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include 
both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially 
limited under paragraph (a)(2). 
[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be 
declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To 
determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and 
type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See 
also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation 
of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see 
Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope. 
[4J If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the 
representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). 
See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is 
determined both by the lawyer'S ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to 
represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer'S duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also 
Comments [5] and [29J. 
[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or 
realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the 
lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on 
the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the 
conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 
1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has 
withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c}. 
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Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse 
[6J Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that clienfs 
informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer 
represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is 
directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the 
lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is 
undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other 
client, Le., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. 
Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a 
witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in 
the lawsuit. On the other hand, simUltaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only 
economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not 
ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients. 
[7J Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent 
the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, 
unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client. 
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation 
[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's 
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a 
result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals 
seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible 
positions that each might take because of the lawyer'S duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses 
altematives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself 
require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if 
it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering altematives 
or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. 
Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons 
[9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially 
limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as 
fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director. 
Personal Interest Conflicts 
[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For 
example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for 
the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions conceming possible employment 
with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially 
limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect 
representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. 
See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with 
clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law 
firm). 
[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related 
by blood, marriage or other domestic relationship, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed 
and that the lawyer'S domestic relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a 
result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the 
lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling, 
spouse or domestic partner, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another 
party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family or domestic relationship 
is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10. 
[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates 
the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j). 
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Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service 
[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is infonmed of that 
fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the 
client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's 
representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the 
lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the 
requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including detenmining whether the conflict is 
consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate infonmation about the material risks of the representation. 
Prohibited Representations 
[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph 
(b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot property ask for such agreement or 
provide representation on the basis of the clienfs consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the 
question of consentability must be resolved as to each client. 
[15] Consentability is typically detenmined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected 
if the clients are penmitted to give their infonmed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under 
paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the 
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence). 
[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable 
law. For example, in some states SUbstantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one 
defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain 
representations by a fonmer govemment lawyer are prohibited, despite the infonmed consent of the fonmer client. In 
addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a govemmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a 
conflict of interest. 
[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous 
development of each clienfs pOSition when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or 
other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this 
paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's 
multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under 
Rule 1.0(m», such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1). 
Informed Consent 
[18] Infonmed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material 
and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 
1.0(e) (infonmed consent). The infonmation required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks 
involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the infonmation must include the 
implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attomey-client 
privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on 
confidentiality). 
[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, 
when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure 
necessary to penmit the other client to make an infonmed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In 
some cases the altemative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation 
with the possibility of inCUrring additional CO$ts. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, 
are factors that may be considered by the affected client in detenmining whether common representation is in the client's 
interests. 
Consent Confirmed in Writing 
[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the infonmed consent of the client, confinmed in writing. Such a 
writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the 
client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is 
not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives infonmed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or 
transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not sup::>lant the need 
in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the Client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened 
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with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available altematives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to 
consider the risks and altematives and to raise questions and concems. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress 
upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that 
might later occur in the absence of a writing. 
Revoking Consent 
[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the 
lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer 
from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the 
client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client 
and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result. 
Consent to Future Conflict 
[22] Whether a lawyer may property request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test 
of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably 
understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future 
representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those 
representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to 
consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective 
with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be 
ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other 
hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that 
a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularty if, e.g., the client is independently represented 
by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the 
representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are 
such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b). 
Conflicts in Litigation 
[23] Paragraph (b}(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' 
consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as 
coplaintiffs or codefendants, is govemed by paragraph (a}(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in 
the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially 
different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well 
as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that 
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of 
persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met. 
[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different 
clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the 
interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of 
interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the 
lawyer'S effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client 
will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in 
determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is 
substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate 
and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is 
significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of 
the representations or withdraw from one or both matters. 
[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a ctass of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, 
unnamed members of the class are ordinal"ily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying 
paragraph (a}(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before 
representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a 
class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an 
unrelated matter. 
Nonlitigation Conflicts 
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[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of 
directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is 
significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or 
clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely 
prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8]. 
[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called 
upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a 
conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a 
particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, 
including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's 
relationship to the parties involved. 
[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple 
parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is 
permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among 
them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually 
advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, 
working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a 
property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing 
the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of 
incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer 
that the lawyer act for all of them. 
Special Considerations in Common Representation 
[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the 
common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional 
cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the 
clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is 
plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation 
or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial 
between commonly represented clients, representation of mUltiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality 
can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility 
that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors 
are whether the lawyer subsequentiy will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves 
creating or terminating a relationship between the parties. 
[30] A particularty important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-
lawyer confidentiality and the attomey-client privilege. With regard to the attomey-client privilege, the prevailing rule is 
that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation 
eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so 
advised. 
[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one 
client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so 
because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything 
bearing on the representation that might affect that clienfs interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that 
information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as 
part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that 
the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from 
the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the 
clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, 
the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely 
affect representation involving a jOint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the 
informed consent of both clients. 
[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's 
role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to 
assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope 
of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at 
the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). 
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent 
representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 conceming the obligations to a fOmler client. The client also has the right to 
discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16. 
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[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily 
represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a}. Thus, the lawyer 
for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the 
circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding 
between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, 
or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's 
representation of the other client. 
[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine 
whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in 
matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may 
arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the 
corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will 
compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should 
cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of 
the board that in some clrcumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of 
director might not be protected by the attomey-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the 
lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation 
in a matter. 
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WAIVER OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
I have read the foregoing letter dated September 19,2009 and the foregoing ethics Rule 
1.7. I understand the nature and extent of the conflict of interest that Seiniger Law 
Offices, P.A. has in regard to the attorney fee issue in my worker's compensation case 
titled Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center. 
I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72 
to support their claim for attorney fees. I knowingly and voluntarily elect to waive the 
conflict of interest. 
I understand that I have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or to sign an 
affidavit supporting the claim ofSeiniger Law Offices, P.A. for attorney's fees. 
T have had an opportunity to discuss this issue with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. to my 
satisfaction. I also understand that I have the right to consult with separate legal counsel 
before signing this waiver or before signing any affidavit 
Date q !:;U /0 9 
I 
,2009. 
~~~ Laure Kulm 
o.20qo(k.v,ud!Jduk~.1 ~&I/J/-.I i75"'O:} 
Address 
(6""0 5) yA 4- o9<..{Co 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LA W OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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Laurel Kulm, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. I was injured in my workplace on or about November 2, 2006. At the time I was working 
as a sleep technologist. In years past, I had worked as a paralegal, among other things. 
3. I retained Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (hereinafter "Counsel") to represent me in the 
above-entitled matter. I signed a CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 1N A 
S8N1GER L4.W OFFICES, PA, 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 8'3702 
(200)34&1000 
AFFIDAVIT Q' LAUREL KULM 
IN SUPPORT OF CJ,.A.IMANJ"S COUNSEL'S 
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WORKER'S COMPENSA nON CASE (hereinafter "FEE AGREEMENT'), dated June 
1,2007. 
4. I read and understood the FEE AGREEMENT before I signed it. I had an opportunity to 
discuss its terms with Coun.sel before signing. I understood that Coun.sel was going to 
receive an attorney fee on any benefits that were received after representation began, 
including benefits from a permanent partial impairment rating (pPI) and benefits from a 
finding of permanent partial disability (PPD), if any. 
5. Prior to retaining Counsel, my employer and its surety had not guaranteed any benefits to 
me. 
6. Prior to retaining Counsel, I did not know ifI would have any permanent impairment No 
doctor had said to me that I would, or would not, have any permanent impairment 
7. Prior to retaining Coun.sel, I did not know if I would have any permanent work 
restrictions from my injury. 
8. Prior to retaining Coun.sel, I did not know ifI would have any permanent partial 
disability. Ultimately, my Counsel sent me for a vocational evaluation by Dr. Mary 
Barros-Bailey, 'Who made a finding ofPPD. 
9. I sought to retain an attorney for several reasons, including: I felt that I was getting the 
run-around from the worker's compensation adjuster, I had been told that I might not 
have a case; I had been told that my injury might not be covered because it was pre-
existing from degenerative disease; I wanted to know what my legal rights were; I wanted 
advice on what to do; I wanted the other side to know that I was represented; and I 
wanted an attorney to fight for me. I believed that I was getting pushed around bec;mse ~ 
did not have a lawyer. 
SSNIGER LAW OFACES, P A 
942W. Myrtle Street 
BoiSe, Idaho 83702 
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10. In signing the FEE AGREEMENT, I understood that I was agreeing to pay a contingent 
fee on PPI benefits even if the benefits turned out to be uncontested, but it was worth it to 
me because I wanted to have an attorney to act as my legal C01D1selor and as my advocate. 
11. I could not have afforded to pay an attorney on an hourly fee basis. 
12. I have received and reviewed the Industrial Commission's ORDER APPROVING IN 
PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT. RELEASE AND LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT filed September 4, 2009 (hereinafter "ORDER"'), including the 
Commission's findings in the ORDER that attorney fees "have not been substantiated to 
the Commission as reasonable in accordance with IDAPA ] 7.02.08.033." I have also 
received and reviewed a letter dated September 3,2009, from Scott McDougal, Manager 
of the Claims and Benefits Section of the Commission, including his statement that a 
"portion of the requested fees related to benefits in excess of the $12,223,13 Lump Sum 
Consideration. , . have not been found to be reasonable per lDAP A 17.02.08.033." 
13. I do not agree with the above findings that the attorney fees being requested by my 
Counsel are not reasonable. As I have stated to my Counsel on several occasions, I 
believe that they did an excellent job for me on my case. 
14. I have not been consulted by the Commission or by Mr. McDougal on the issue of the 
reasonableness of the requested attorney fees or on the issue of whether I would like to 
have my FEE AGREEMENT with Counsel upheld 
15. I believe that I have a right to have my FEE AGREEMENT with my Counsel upheld apd 
I would like for it to be upheld, including my obligation to pay the agreed fee in full to 
Counsel for the services provided 
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16. I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72 
to support my COWlSel's claim to receive the requested attorney fees. Nonetheless, 1 
knowingly and voluntarily support their claim for attorney fees in full. 
FURTIIER SA YETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT. 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public in and for the state of NfW f\A.ex"{ 0 
Nw Jv\tX!'/O , on this the ~/s, day of 1epk-m ber ' 2009. ~J(. 
... ~ . ~ . 
... ' _.- :- : 
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Residing at: 
My Commission expires: Jet n ()~ ''/ ;l'i I 2..0 13 
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Wm. Breck Seiniget, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P .A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Laurel Kulm, 
Claimant, 
I.e. No. 06-012770 
vs. 
Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR 
ATTORNEYFEEHE~G 
and 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. and files its STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR 
ATTORNEY FEE HEARING, as follows: 
1. Issues of whether the attorney fee hearing may even be held 
1.1.Whether the Industrial Commission may hold an attorney fee hearing pursuant to IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.03(b) under the following circumstances: 
1.1.1. The Commission failed to follow its own rule in IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03( a) that 
"Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staffs informal determination, 
which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not 
reasonable. " 
1.1.2. The Commission failed to rule on Counsel's MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW filed September 18,2009, where the 
grounds for said Motion were that the Commission staff did not "notify counsel in 
writing of ... the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not 
reasonable." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a). 
1.1.3. The Commission failed to provide the Claimant with "notice and an opportunity 
to he heard," even though Claimant is one of the "contracting parties" to whom "the 
Commission must afford due process," all in direct contravention of Claimant's 
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constitutional rights as set forth in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993). 
2. Issues of whether the attorney fee may even be denied at this late date, even if an 
attorney fee hearing is held 
2.1.Ifthe Industrial Commission does hold an attorney fee hearing, whether it may refuse to 
approve a request for attorney fees when the following circumstances exist: 
2.1.1. The Commission failed to follow its own rule in IDAP A 17.02.08.033,03(b) that 
"Commission staffwill notify counsel in writing of the sta:Ers informal determination, 
which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not 
reasonable." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a). 
2.1.2. The Commission failed to rule on Counsel's MOTION FOR FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW filed September 18,2009, where the 
grounds for said Motion were that the Commission staff did not "notify counsel in 
writing of ... the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not 
reasonable." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a). 
2.1.3. The Commission refused to allow Counsel to take a deposition, notice of which 
was filed on September 18, 2009, of Scott McDougall, the Commission staff member 
who issued "the sta:Ers informal determination ... that the requested fee is not 
reasonable." IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a). 
2.1.4. The Commission failed to rule on Counsel's MOTION TO PRODUCE 
COMMISSION'S CLAIM FILE OF CLAIMANT filed September 18, 2009, and 
failed to produce said file. 
2.1.5. The Commission failed to provide the Claimant with "notice and an opportunity 
to be heard," even though Claimant is one of the "contracting parties" to whom "the 
Commission must afford due process," all in direct contravention of Claimant's 
constitutional rights as set forth in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993). 
3. Issues raised in Counsel's Request for Hearing 
3.1.1s Claimant's Counsel entitled to retain attorney's fees paid prior to the approval of the 
lump sum agreement between the parties in this case (in the approximate amount of 
$3,301.72) and 25% of the new money consideration to be paid to the Claimant per the 
Lump Sum Agreement in the amount of$3,055.78? 
3.2.Are the attorney's fees claimed by Claimant's Counsel consistent with the fee agreement 
executed by the Claimant? 
3.3.Are the attorney's fees claimed by Claimant's Counsel reasonable in light of the services 
performed? 
3.4.1s Claimant's Counsel entitled to the attorney's fees under IDAPA 17.02.08.33? Sub 
issues involved in resolving this issue include, but are not limited to: 
3.4.1. Is Claimant's Counsel limited to "Available funds" as defined in IDAP A 
17.02.08.33.01.a? 
3.4.2. Is Claimant's Counsel's compensation limited to "The services of the attorney 
operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks 
to be paid ... " (IDAPA 17.02.08.33.01.c.ii)? 
3.4.3. Is Claimant's Counsel required to meet the standard of reasonableness contained 
in IDAPA 17.02.08.33 in light of the prohibition against limiting attorneys fees to 
"new money" as detennmed and contained in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,864 P.2d 
132 (1993) - a case in which the precise holdings on the precise Constitutional issues 
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raised therein have never been overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court? 
3.4.4. Is the Commission required to consider the equities involved in compensating 
Claimant's Counsel for work done prior to and unrelated to the consideration 
contained in the Lump Sum Agreement in view of the IDAP A 17.02.08.033.c.i 
language, "There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable 
principles ... " 
3.5.Does Claimant have the right to have her contract with Counsel honored, assuming it 
complies with IDAP A rules and disclosure requirements? 
3.6.Prior to a hearing pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03.b, is Claimant's Counsel entitled 
to notice of the facts and the conclusions of law upon which the Commission relied in 
making its finding in the above-referenced ORDER that the attorney's fees requested by 
Counsel were not reasonable? 
3.7.Ifthe Commission stafffails to notify Counsel "in writing" of ' 'the reasons for the 
determination that the requested fee is not reasonable," as required by IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.03.a., is Counsel prejudiced by the issuance of an order denying his 
attorney fees? 
4. Issues regarding the level of proof 
4.1.Whether the Commission may interpret the level of proof pursuant to IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.03 to require that proof that a "specific benefit was delayed" to be nothing 
less than documentary. 
4.2. Whether the Commission may interpret the level of proof pursuant to IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.03 to require "absolute proof," i.e. require Counsel to prove a causal link 
between his representation and the payment of benefits by demonstrating nothing less 
than that without his representation, the benefits would not have been paid. 
4.3. Whether the Commission may interpret the phrase "primarily or substantially" as it 
appears in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.0 1 (c)(ii) to constitute a higher level of proof than 
"preponderance of the evidence" as it appears in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.d. 
4.4. Whether the Commission may "cherry-pick" to which benefits it will apply its 
interpretation of the "primarily or substantially" standard, i.e. whether it must apply the 
same level of proof and the same standards to requests for attorney fees based on time-
loss or disability benefits obtained as it applies to impairment benefits obtained. 
5. Due Process issues raised by Curr 
5.1.Whether the Commission may interpret or apply IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in such a way that 
one or more of the following results: 
5.1.1. It fails to compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor. 
5.1.2. It fails to recognize efforts by the attorney that do not generate monetary awards. 
5.1.3. It makes suspect an attorney's integrity in the eyes of his clients. 
5.1.4. It limits attorney fees to "new money" benefits. 
5.1.5. It preempts representation other than in disputed matters. 
5.2.Whether IDAPA 17.02.08.033 as written, interpreted, and applied by the Commission 
constitutes the "clear evidentiary standards" required by Curro 
5.3.Whether Claimant must be provided with "notice" of the attorney-fee hearing and an 
"opportunity to be heard" at said hearing. 
6. Contract property rights issues raised by CUIT 
6.1. Whether the Commission may interpret or apply IDAP A 17.02.08.033 in such a way that 
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one or more of the following results: 
6.1.1. The unconstitutional impairment of the attorney's rights under the fee contract. 
6.1.2. The unconstitutional impairment of the Claimant's rights under the fee contract. 
6.1.3. In determining the "reasonableness" of the attorney fee, the Commission is using 
its hindsight-based judgment instead of considering lithe totality of the circumstances 
from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement was made. II 
6.1.4. In deciding whether to take the case of a claimant who solicits his services, an 
attorney is essentially required to predict if the claimant will eventually have an 
impairment rating (even though no physician could accurately make such a 
prediction), and if so whether the surety might dispute it, and if disputed what the end 
result might be. 
6.2. Whether the Commission may refuse to honor a claimant's fee agreement with her 
attorney over the direct objections of the claimant. 
7. Issues involving reconciling IDAP A 17.02.08.033 with Curr 
7.1.Whether the Commission may interpret or apply IDAPA 17.02.08.033, including without 
limitation the terms "Available Funds,1I IICharging Lien,1I and IIprimarily or substantiallyll 
in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, and applicable law including 
without limitation I.C. 72-508. 
8. Equal protection issues 
8.1. Whether the Commission may constitutionally allow employers and sureties in workers' 
compensation matters to pay their counsel for the mere giving oflegal advice, but not 
allow claimants to pay their counsel for the mere giving of legal advice. 
8.2. Whether the Commission may constitutionally promulgate separate standards for the 
legal and medical professions in regard to allowing the payment for services rendered by 
them in workers' compensation matters. 
9. Public Policy issues 
9.1.Whetherthe Commission may interpret or apply IDAPA 17.02.08.033 in such a way that 
one or more of the following results: 
9.1.1. Claimants are less likely to be able to find counsel to take their case. 
9.1.2. Attorneys are discouraged from taking workers' compensation cases because the 
Commission does not honor their fee agreements with their clients. 
9.1.3. The attorney-client relationship is damaged by the Commission's creation of a 
conflict of interest between attorney and client each time the Commission or its staff 
finds the requested attorney fee to be unreasonable, and by the the implication in each 
such instance that the attorney acted unfairly, unethically, or unreasonably. 
9.1.4. The confidence of claimants and attorneys in the legal system is undermined 
when the Commission, via its website and its publications, strongly encourages 
claimants to seek legal advice, but at the end of the case tells claimants and attorneys 
that it will not honor their fee agreement, and/or tells them that portions of the 
attorney's services were of no value, not timely, or not of consequence. 
9.1.5. When attorneys discontinue taking workers' compensation cases because the 
Commission does not honor their fee agreements, and when as a result claimants are 
unable to find counsel to take their case and as a result do not receive their full 
benefits under the workers' compensation law, the burden of medical and financial 
care for these unassisted claimants shifts from the insurers who collected employers' 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345·1000 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR ATTORNEY FEE 
HEARING 
PAGE 4 OF 5 
flf 
premiums to various public welfare and private charity organizations. 
9.2. Whether the Commission should be prohibited from interpreting or applying IDAP A 
17.02.08.033, including especially the "dispute" language of .01(a), in such a way that 
one or more of the following results: 
9.2.1. The plaintiffs bar is encouraged to work toward finding ways to foster, or at least 
to demonstrate and document, that there was a "fight, contest, or dispute" between the 
claimant and defendants. 
9.2.2. The more reputable attorneys are penalized, because they are less likely to have 
benefits disputed by the surety, and therefore, less likely to receive approval from the 
Commission for their attorney fees (and less likely to take on injured workers' cases 
in the future). 
9.2.3. The surety is essentially put in charge of determining how much a claimant's 
attorney will be paid, because attorney fees are based more on the surety's decisions 
of what to "dispute" than on any of the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5 of the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the value of the attorney's services. 
10. Legislative intent issues 
10.1. Whether IDAP A 17.02.08.033 as written, interpreted, and applied by the 
Commission is contrary to legislative intent. 
11. De Novo hearing issues 
11.1. Whether a hearing held pursuant to 17.02.08.033.03(b) is not a de novo hearing, 
since prior to such hearing, the Commissioners have already received an ex parte 
presentation of evidence and legal reasoning from Commission staff, and therefore 
whether counsel is prejudiced thereby. 
12. Discovery issues 
12.1. Whether counsel is entitled to discover any facts or standards upon which the 
Commission staff relied in making its informal determination pursuant to 
17.02.08.033.03(a) 
12.2. Whether the manager of the benefits section and his staff members known as 
compensation consultants perform any judicial, quasi-judicial, or other privileged 
functions in making the staffs informal determination pursuant to 17.02.08.033.03(a) 
Dated: this 22 day of November, 2009. 
Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. 
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MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, ) ORDER GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL 
) DOCUMENTS TO THE RECORD 
Employer, ) 
and ) 
) FI LED 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
NOV 17 2009 OFNA, ) 
) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Surety, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Claimant's Attorney ("Attorney") filed the motion for ex parte order to allow testimony 
by affidavit on November 4, 2009 with additional documents, including Attorney's 
correspondence with Claimant on September 19, 2009; Claimant's waiver of the conflict of 
interest signed on September 21,2009; and, Claimant's affidavit in support of Attorney's request 
for fees. Attorney requests that the Commission include the documents as part of the record for 
Attorney's upcoming hearing on his entitlement to attorney's fees under IDAP A 17.02.08.033. 
Attorney's request to include these documents into the record is GRANTED. 
DATED this my of ~ 2009. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
tj)!m~ 
R.D. Maynard, Cha an 
ORDER GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS TO THE RECORD - 1 
/ {3 
ATTEST: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / '1 ~y of ~ , 2009 a true and correct copy of 
Order Granting Supplemental Documents to the Record was served by regular United States 
Mail upon each of the following persons: 
BRECKSEINIGER 
942 W MYRTLE ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
ALAN HULL 
250 SOUTH 5TH STE. 700 
POBOX 7426 
BOISE ID 83707-7426 
cs-mlcjh 
ORDER GRANTING SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS TO THE RECORD - 2 
IlL( 
n-Q I hi f\ll\ I 
\......-' t\lVII'V1 \L.... 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P .A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 




Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 




I.C. No. 06-012770 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH 
REGARDING ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE 
IN RENTERIA v. RICK CARLEY 
CONSTRUCTION LLC and 
LffiERTY NORTHWEST, I.G.~06-507603 
~- c-:! i'''<1 . 
. , 
Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P .A., and attorney of record 
for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. An attorney fee hearing was held in the above-entitled matter on Nov. 23, 2009. At said 
hearing (beginning at page 50 of the transcript of said hearing), the Commissioners and 
Mr. Breck Seiniger (Claimant's Counsel) held a discussion regarding attorney fee issues 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH REGARDING A TIORNEY FEE 
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in the case ofRENTERlA V. RlCK CARLEY CONSTRUCTION LLC AND LIBERTY 
NORTHWEST, I.e. 06-507603 (hereinafter "Renteria"), in which this firm represented 
claimant Jose Renteria. 
3. In Renteria, the claimant was due a scheduled PPI benefit for an eye enucleation surgery 
authorized by the surety. After the surgery, the surety ignored Counsel's repeated 
demands for payment of PPI benefits for nearly four months, until fmally Counsel filed a 
complaint and motion for emergency hearing. In response, surety agreed to start paying 
the undisputed benefits if Counsel would withdraw the motion, which Counsel did. 
Subsequently, the parties reached a lump sum settlement agreement at mediation. The 
LSSA provided for Counsel to receive attorney fees of25% of the PPI benefits, on the 
basis that but for Counsel's litigation, surety would not have started paying the PPI 
benefits. However, the Commission refused to approve the LSSA. More than a year later, 
the parties entered a second lump sum settlement agreement, in which the terms were 
essentially identical to the first LSSA except that Counsel waived his right to receive 
attorney fees on the PPI benefit. The second LSSA was promptly approved by the 
Commission. The Commission's rejection of the first LSSA resulted in a substantial loss 
to Counsel of earned attorney fees on the PPI benefits. 
4. At the above-refereIiced hearing, the Commissioners seemed to indicate that under the 
above facts, Counsel may have been entitled to an attorney fee on the PPI benefits. 
Because the Commissioners expressed interest in this issue, Counsel is providing this 
Affidavit and the facts surrounding the Renteria case. 
5. In support of the facts set forth herein, the following documents from the Renteria case 
are attached hereto as Exhibits A thru F: 
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a. Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing, and Affidavit in Support Thereof, filed 
2/7/08. 
b. Notice of Withdrawal of Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing, filed 2/12/08. 
c. (for the first LSSA) Form 1022, filed 6/6/08. 
d. Letter from Dennis Burks, Mediator, notifying Counsel of the Commission's 
denial of the first LSSA, dated 6/16/08. 
e. (for the second LSSA) Form 1022, filed 11110/09. 
f. (for the second LSSA) Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and 
Order of Approval and Discharge, approved 11/16/09. 
FURTHER SA YETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
Dated December 24, 2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
4.,hf?W~ 
An}ltew Marsh L 
Morney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on December 24,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document (with the exception of the exhibits, omitted due to the volume of pages but which 
will promptly be provided upon request) to be served as follows: 
Alan Hull 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL 
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 
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Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
(17 
PO Box 7426 
Boise ID 83707-7426 
Fax: (208) 344-5510 
lRlFax 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
" 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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Andrew Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
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I. C. No. 06-5076j3 
MOTION REQutS'I'ING 
EMERGENCY IiEA:R.lNG 
COMES NOW the Claimant in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel, 
pursuant to Ru1e Vill(D) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Law, and hereby requests this Commission schedu1e an emergency 
hearing in the above-captioned matter regarding Defendants' failure to pay permanent 
impairment benefits and time-loss benefits, as well as an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 
§72-804. 
The primary issue in this case is that Defendants, without reasonable ground and without 
explanation, and despite repeated demands from Claimant's counsel, have failed to pay statutory 
MOTION REQUESTING EMERGENCY HEARING 
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benefits for loss of an eye in a workplace accident, even though Defendants have paid medical 
benefits on the claim, and even though Defendants have never disputed that Claimant was an 
employee, that an accident occurred, that Claimant's eye was injured in the accident, and that 
surgical removal of the injured eye was necessitated by the accident. 
The facts underlying the matter are set forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, counsel 
for Claimant, and its accompanying exhibits, attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
It is necessary for the Commission to hear this matter on an emergency basis because 
Claimant has a grave financial need for the benefits being withheld. 
A second issue is whether the actions of the employer and the surety are such that 
Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. 72-804. 
Based upon the foregoing, Claimant requests that the Industrial Commission schedule an 
emergency hearing at the earliest available date as follows: 
1. Issues: 
a Whether Claimant is entitled to time-loss benefits from the date of injury and 
from the date of enucleation surgery; 
b. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent impairment benefits for surgical 
removal of an eye following a workplace injury to the eye; 
c. Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
2. Location of the hearing: The Claimant requests that this matter be scheduled for 
hearing in Boise. 
3. Desired date of the hearing: At any time. Claimant's counsel requests a call prior to the 
scheduling of this matter to ensure that dates currently available remain available. 
4. Unavailable dates of counsel: Claimant's counsel is unavailable as follows: 
MOTION REQUESTING EMERGENCY HEARING 
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February 7-12, 15, 18,20 & 27-29; 
March 3, 6, & 21; 
April 7, 14-18 & 24, 2008. 
5. Estimated length of hearing: One half(1I2) day. 
6. Settlement negotiation statuslMediation: Because this case involves Defendants' 
refusal to meet statutory responsibilities as set forth above, 'mediation of this claim would 
not provide an adequate remedy. 
7. Hearing by the full Commission: Not necessary. 
8. Translator: The Claimant requires the services of a Spanish translator during the 
hearing of this matter. 
9. Other Information: Claimant requests that the matter be set for a telephone conference 
to confirm continuing availability of hearing dates and to narrow the issues to be 
addressed at the hearing. 
/ 
Dated: this -'2 day of February 2008. 
~&()~ 
An wMarsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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SEINIGDt LAW OFFICES, P.A.. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
208-345·1000 
lel( 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on this £ day of February 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
r:&J Via Facsimile Transmission 
a Via First Class USPS mail 
a Via Certified USPS mail 
a Via Hand Delivery 
Liberty Northwest 
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 
P.O. Box 7507 
Boise,TID 83707-1507 
Fax: (800) 256-3856 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
MOTION REQUESTING EMERGENCY HEARING 
Page 4 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
208-345-1000 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387) 
Andrew Marsh (ISB #6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Voice: (208) 345-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BEFORE THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
.JOSE RENTERIA, 
Claimant, IIC No. 06-507603 j 
vs. AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW MARSH IN 







Andrew Marsh, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Counsel for Claimant in the above-entitled case. 
2. I am over the age of eighteen years. 
3. I make this affidavit of my own personal knowledge and belief. 
4. On 10118/07, Claimant underwent enucleation (surgical removal) of his left eye in the 
above-captioned workers compensation matter. See medical record-of Dr. Mark 
Boehner, attached as Exhibit A. 
fXHlBlTL 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW MARSH- 1 
\ 1;"3 
5. On 10/24/07, Counsel faxed a request for time-loss benefits to Defendants. See 
ExhibitB. 
6. On 1216/07, Counsel faxed a request for time-loss benefits to Defendants. See Exhibit 
C. 
7. On 12/19/07, Counsel faxed a request for pe~ent impairment benefits to 
Defendants. See Exhibit D. 
8. On 12126/07, Counsel faxed a letter Defendants offering to discuss the benefit issues. 
See Exhibit E. This letter included a copy of an Independent Medical Examination 
report prepared by Dr. Richard Radnovich. 
9. On 215/08, Counsel faxed a request for impairment and thD.e-Ioss benefits to 
Defendants. See Exhibit F. 
10. On numerous occasions between 10125/07 and 215/08, Counsel (or Counsel's 
paralegal) spoke to or left messages for Defendants by phone regarding benefits due 
Claimant 
11. Since Claimant's enucleation surgery on 10118/07, Claimant has not received any 
time-loss benefits. 
12. Since Claimant's enucleation surgery on 10118/07, Claimant has not received any 
permanent impairment benefits. 
13. Counsel for Claimant is informed and believes that Claimant has a financial need for 
his workers' compensation benefits. 
! 
DATED: February e-' 2008. 
~<~u~ An wMarsh /' 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW MARSH- 2 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on February ~ 2008. 
AFFIDA VIT OF ANDREW MARSH- 3 
Gd D kJ};t tQ) 
NOTARY PUBLIC m and for the State of Idaho 
Residing in: NPcM.ek 
My Commission Expires: 1(is:-/iO, z.. 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Voice: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
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I. C. No. 06-507603 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF 
MOTION REQUESTING 
EMERGENCY HEARING 
COMES NOW the Claimant in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel, 
pursuant to Rule VIII(D) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Law, and hereby files this Notice of Withdrawal of Claimant's Motion 
Requesting Emergency Hearing filed 217108. Defendant Liberty Northwest has contacted 
Counsel for Plaintiff and stated that they would begin paying permanent partial impairment 
benefits if Claimant would withdraw the Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing filed 217108. 
Dated: this !Yday of February 2008. 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION REQUESTING 
EMERGENCY HEARING 
Page 1 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 Myrtle Street 




~(/~ Aii~ t..--' 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on this l2-aay of February 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
IXI Via Facsimile Transmission 
a Via First Class USPS mail 
a Via Certified USPS mail 
a Via Hand Delivery 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Liberty Northwest 
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 
P.O. Box 7507 
Boise, ID 83707-1507 
Attn: Pat 
Fax: ,(800) 972-3213 
¢i:~~~ 
An wMarsh / 
Attorney for Claimant 
NOTICE OF WITIIDRA W AL OF MOTION REQUESTING 
EMERGENCY HEARING 
Page 2 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 Myrtle Street 




Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB #6588) 
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P. A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700 












BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STA~F mAHO 
JOSE RENTERIA~ 
Claimant, 
I.C. No. 06-507603 
vs. 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 







Comes now Claimant's counsel and "reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case: 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL· 
EXHlBlT-
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a fmal 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
Total Amount Benefits to Claimant 
Total Amount Lump Sum New Money 
Attorneys fees incurred in litigation: 
Attorneys fees taken prior to lump sum: 
Attorneys fees taken from lump sum: 
Expenses incurred in litigation: 
Expenses previously reimbursed (Dr. Radnovich; 
DougCrum): 
Costs to be repaid to Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. from 
- LumpSum 
Total Attorneys Fees and Costs from settlement 
Monies held in trust pending negotiations: 












1. Seiniger Law Offices .. P.A. ("Counsel") was retained by Jose Renteria ("Claimant") on or 
about April 18, 2007. 
2. At the time Counsel was retained by Claimant, the only benefits that defendants conceded 
were the medical benefits already incurred and certain TIDs that had been paid but previously 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL - 2 
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discontinued. All benefits received thereafter were as the results of Counsel's efforts, demands, 
and negotiations. 
3. This case was settled in mediation before Dennis Burks, Industrial Commission 
Mediation Department. Date of mediation was May 22, 2008. 
4. Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and 
circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits, 
the status of medical treatment, and the background to Claimant as it related to potential 
disability in addition to impairment, etc. 
5. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for 
benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need 
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission rehabilitation 
department, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. 
6. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
7. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was recorded 
for later use in the handling of the claim. 
8. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the following 
documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement meeting the 
requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment releases; a 
letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho Industrial 
Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical providers 
requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the primary 
treating doctor requesting an detailed report regarding the etiology of Claimant's condition, 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL· 3 
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treatment to date, impainnent rating, and permanent restrictions; a client intake questionnaire for 
the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's employment, educational, 
medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history; a draft of a complaint and 
discovery. 
9. Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other documents which 
were requested as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case 
on a periodic basis. 
10. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, aspects of 
medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and strategic 
issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a Workers. Compensation Case. 
11. Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and injuries. 
12. Counsel's paralegal spent many hours translating important documents or 
correspondence from English into Spanish for the benefit of Claimant, whose native language is 
Spanish. 
13. Defendants denied, discontinued or disputed Oaimant's right to the following benefits: 
Oaimant"s entitlement to medical and time loss benefits, the nature and extent of impainnent and 
disability above impairment, and entitlement to retraining and attorney fees. 
14. On or about 8127/07, Counsel wrote Surety confirming that there should be authorization 
for the referral by primary treating physician, Dr. Leo Harf, to eye surgeon specialist Dr. Mark 
Boerner on the issue of possible removal of the injured eye. No objection was received from 
Surety. After examining Claimant, on 9/13/07 Dr. Boehner scheduled evisceration surgery for 
10118/07. On 10117/07, Claimant was informed by Dr. Boerner's office that Surety had not 
authorized the next day's surgery and it would have to be cancelled. Counsel immediately 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL - 4 
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contacted Surety by phone and fax and insisted that the surgery must be authorized to proceed as 
scheduled. Counsel expressed that Claimant's physicians had determined there was an urgent 
medical need for the surgery, and that it might take another month to get the surgery on Dr. 
Boerner's schedule as it had the fIrst time. It was also Counsel's position that workers 
compensation law required the Employer/Surety to pay for treatment of a workplace injury as 
prescribed by Claimant's treating physicians. In response, Surety ultimately agreed to authorize 
the surgery and it was performed as scheduled the next day on 10118/07. 
15. Despite Counsel's efforts to obtain authorization for the evisceration surgery on 10118/07, 
Counsel did not seek attorney fees on that medical benefIt. 
I ' 
• 
16. Counsel wrote Surety on 10/24/07 and requested TID benefIts on the grounds that Dr. 




the ensuing four months, Counsel followed up on the TID request by phone and in writing. No 
TID benefIts were received. 
17. On 10125/07. Counsel wrote Dr. Boerner and requested a report of the treatment he had 
provided Claimant, a permanent impairment rating, and a statement of pennanent work 
restrictions. Counsel received and reviewed his response, and discussed it with Claimant. 
18. Counsel recommended to Claimant that he obtain a permanent impairment rating and a 
detailed statement of pennanent work restrictions from an independent medical examiner, so that 
Claimant could be effectively evaluated by a vocational expert on the issues of disability beyond 
impairment and options for retraining. Counsel's recommendations were based on concerns 
involving Claimant's limited work experience, limited job skills (manual labor), youthful age 
(25), and language barriers. Claimant concurred, and Counsel arranged for an appointment with 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL - 5 
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vocational medicine expert Dr. Richard Radnovich on 11119/07. Counsel's paralegal attended 
Claimant's appoint with Dr. Radnovich and served as translator. 
19. Subsequently, Counsel received Dr. Radnovich's IME report and sent it to Surety on 
12119/07 with a request that Surety begin paying PPI benefits for the eye injury. In the ensuing 
months, Counsel followed up on the PPI request by phone and in writing. No PPI benefits were 
received. 
20. On 217/08, Counsel prepared and filed a Complaint seeking payment of the PPI and lTD 
benefits. 
21. On 217/08, Counsel prepared and filed a Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing on the 
grounds that PPI and other benefits were seriously past due and that Claimant had a definitive 
financial need for his workers' compensation benefits. The motion was supported by the affidavit 
of Counsel Andrew Marsh. 
22. In addition, the motion sought "an award of attorney fees pursuant to lC. §72-804 ... 
[because] Defendants, without reasonable ground and without explanation, and despite repeated 
demands from Claimant's counsel, have failed to pay statutory benefits for loss of an eye in a 
workplace accident." 
23. On 218/08, Counsel prepared and filed interrogatories and requests for production on 
defendants. 
24. On 2113/08, defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint in which they conceded that 
PPI benefits were due. 
25. On or about that same time, defendants contacted Counsel for Claimant proposing terms 
of payment of PPI benefits. Upon reaching agreement, Counsel filed a Notice Of Withdrawal Of 
Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing (including a withdrawal of Counsel's demand for 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL - 6 
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attorney fees under I.C. §72-804) which read in pertinent part: ''Defendant Liberty Northwest has 
I 
; 
contacted Counsel for Plaintiff and stated that they would begin paying permanent partial 
impairment benefits if Claimant would withdraw the Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing 
I filed 217/08." , 
26. On 2114108, the first PPI check was received, which was nearly four months after the 
surgery that gave rise to the eligibility for benefits. On 2122108, the TID check was received. 
27. Following the evisceration surgery, Counsel and his paralegal spent much time working 
on arrangements with specialist Sam Murano for authorization and provision of an ocular 
prosthetic. Counsel subsequently requested and obtained from Murano a projection for future 
prosthesis care and replacement for purposes of proving and negotiating future medical care 
benefits for Claimant 
28. Following the IME report from Dr. Radnovich, Counsel recommended and arranged for 
Claimant to obtain a vocational evaluation from specialist Doug Crum, who determined that 
Claimant should be compensated an additional 15% for disability beyond impairment Counsel 
obtained this report for purposes of proving and negotiating PPD benefits for Claimant. 
29. Prior to lump sum negotiations, Counsel reviewed Claimant's wage history with the 
date-of-injury employer and concluded that his average weekly wage was higher than that which 
Surety had used in the calculations of the original TID benefits, and that there had been previous 
periods for which Claimant had not been paid TIDs. Counsel provided his evidence and 
calculations to defendants for purposes of proving and negotiating compensation for Claimant 
for underpaid TIDs and unpaid TIDs. 
30. Counsel engaged in extensive negotiations with representatives of the defendants. 
Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant concerning the status of the case, and the 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL - 7 
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strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with respect to settlement discussions and 
preparation for hearing. 
31. Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs which would be 
incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from his medical providers and related 
experts. Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay which would be involved in submitting 
this case for resolution to the Commission. 
32. Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. engaged in extensive settlement 
negotiations, and participated in mediation. In mediation, a compromise settlement was reached 
with representatives of the defendants resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those 
which were conceded at the time that Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship. 
33. Claimant elected to settle his case based upon his best judgment and hi.s personal 
situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been submitted to the 
Commission for its approval. 
34. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed portions 
of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant. 
35. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing program 
entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced, and other 
financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial 
Commission Form 1022. 
36. As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between Claimant and 
Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately April 18, 2007until 
the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining certain cases 
because of the size of his caseload, which included this case. Counsel maintained an office and 







staff, including the services of a . full-time paralegal, to be able to handle whatever needs 
Claimant had in conn~tion with this case, as well as the needs of his other clients. 
37. Claimant is presently unemployed and has 1 and 112 minor children . 
. ~.~ 
-. 
DA JED this ~ day of June, 2008. 
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
~.~~ 
Andrbw C. Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on this S--day of June, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy FORM 
1022 REPoRT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF COUNSEL to be served as follows: 
~a FIrst Class Mail USPS 
- 0 Via Certified Mail USPS return receipt 
~ Via Hand Delivery 
o Via Facsimile Transmission 
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P. A. 
=-:;(i~ 1C~--""'"" 
An C. Marsh 
I." 
Attf)mey for Claimant 
Monte Whittier 
Harmon, Whittier & Day 
6213 N. Cloverdale Road, 
Suite #150 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMlVfISSION 
c.L. "BUTCH" OlTER, GOVERNOR 
June 16,2008 
ANDREW C MARSH 
942 MYRTLE ST 
BOISE, ID 83702 
POBox 83720 
Bo~,TID837~1 
(208)334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321 
1-800-950-2110 
COMMISSIONERS 
Jatne6 F. Kilc, Chairman 
R.D. Maynard 
Thomas E. Limbaugh 
Mindy Montgomery, Director 
Re: Jose Antonio Renteria-Sotelo vs. Rick Carley Construction and Liberty Northwest 
Insurance Company, IC#2006-507603 
Dear Mr. Marsh: 
This letter is to advise you that the Industrial Commission did not approve the Lump Sum 
Agreement on the above captioned claim, as it has not been made clear that the settlement 
is in the best interests of all parties. 
Ifboth parties wish to proceed with this proposed settlement, the Commission rules 
provide that additional infonnation may be submitted, or the parties may jointly request a 
hearing on the settlement. 
The copies of the Lump Sum Agreement will be returned to Monte Whittier, Counsel for 
Liberty Northwest Insurance Company. The original Lump Sum Agreement document 
will remain in the Industrial Commission's claim file. 
If you have questions, please call me at (208) 334-6002. 
Thank you, 
n ~ «-0 LU-:-. ~ , 
Dennis Burks, CPM 
Mediator, Idaho Industrial Commission 
Cc: Monte Whittier 
317 Main Street, Boise, ID 
Equal Opportunity Employer 




Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE·STATE OF IDAHO 
Jose Antonio Renteria, 
CIaim.ant, 
vs. 
I.C. No. 06-507603 
Rick Carley Construction LLC, 
Employer, 








COMES NOW Claimanfs Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above· captioned case. 
REPORT OF LmGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
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EXHIBIT _ E 
/lft.j 
PRIOR TO LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT TID 
BENEFITS, paid prior to LSS, subjected to atty fees $1354.38 
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to LSS, on the above $338.59 
COSTS, incurred prior to LSS and reimbursed to atty; $1633.60 
includes Claimant's !ME and Claimant's vocational 
evaluation expert 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT LSS 
BENEFITS, LSS $55,476.78 
ATTORNEY FEES, on LSS $13,603.07 
COSTS, to be reimbursed to atty from LSS $0.00 
Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney 
Contingency Fee Agreement In a Worker's Compensation Case including 
Disclosure Statement 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
1. Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. ("Counsel") was retained by Jose Antonio Renteria 
("Claimant") on or about 4118/2007. 
2. Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and 
circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits, 
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential 
disability beyond impairment, etc. 
3. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for 
benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need 
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation 
Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P A. 
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4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
5. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was 
recorded for use in the handling of the claim. 
6. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment 
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the 
primary treating physician requesting a detailed report of the etiology of Claimant's condition, 
treatment to date, impairment rating, and temporary and permanent restrictions; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's 
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history. 
7. Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested 
documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a 
periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and 
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation 
case. 
9. Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and 
injuries. 
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10. At the time Counsel was retained by Claimant, the only benefits that defendants 
legally conceded were the medical benefits already incurred and certain TIDs that had been paid 
but previously discontinued. All benefits received thereafter, including medical treatment and 
time loss benefits and impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment 
compensation, were as the results of Counsel's reputation, efforts, demands, and negotiations. 
11. Counsel's paralegal spent many hours translating important documents or 
correspondence from English into Spanish for the benefit of Claimant, whose native language is 
Spanish. 
12. On or about 8127/07, Counsel wrote Surety confirming that there should be 
authorization for the referral by primary treating physician, Dr. Leo Harf, to eye surgeon 
specialist Dr. Mark Boerner on the issue of possible removal of the injured eye. No objection 
was received from Surety. After examining Claimant, on 9/13/07 Dr. Boehner scheduled 
evisceration surgery for 10/18/07. On 10/17/07, Claimant was informed by Dr. Boerner's office 
that Surety had not authorized the next day's surgery and it would have to be cancelled. Counsel 
immediately contacted Surety by phone and fax and insisted that the surgery must be authorized 
to proceed as scheduled. Counsel expressed that Claimant's physicians had determined there was 
an urgent medical need for the surgery, and that it might take another month to get the surgery on 
Dr. Boerner's schedule as it had the first time. It was also Counsel's position that workers 
compensation law required the EmployerlSurety to pay for treatment of a workplace injury as 
prescribed by Claimant's treating physicians. In response, Surety ultimately agreed to authorize 
the surgery and it was performed as scheduled the next day on 10118/07. 
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13. Despite Counsel's efforts to obtain authorization for the evisceration surgery on 
10/18/07, Counsel did not seek attorney fees on that medical benefit, even though it was 
Counsel's right to do so. 
14. Counsel wrote Surety on 10/24/07 and requested TID benefits on the grounds 
that Dr. Boerner had taken Clajmant off work during his recuperation from surgery the week 
before. In the ensuing four months, Counsel followed up on the TID request by phone and in 
writing. No TID benefits were received. 
15. On 10/25107, Counsel wrote Dr. Boerner and requested a report of the treatment 
he had provided Claimant, a permanent impairnient rating, and a statement of permanent work 
restrictions. Counsel received and reviewed his response, and discussed it with Claimant. 
16. Counsel recommended to Claimant that he obtain a permanent impairment rating 
and a detailed statement of permanent work restrictions from an independent medical examiner, 
so that Claimant could be effectively evaluated by a vocational expert on the issues of disability 
beyond impairment and options for retraining. Counsel's recommendations were based on 
concerns involving Claimant's limited work experience, limited job skills (manual labor), 
youthful age (25), and language barriers. Claimant concurred, and Counsel arranged for an 
appointment with vocational medicine expert Dr. Richard Radnovich on 11/19/07. Counsel's 
paralegal attended Claimant's appoint with Dr. Radnovich and served as translator. 
17. Subsequently, Counsel received Dr. Radnovich's 1MB report and sent it to Surety 
on 12119/07 with a request that Surety begin paying PPI benefits for the eye injury. In the 
ensuing months, Counsel followed up on the PPI request by phone and in writing. No PPI 
benefits were received. 
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18. On 217/08, Counsel prepared and filed a Complaint seeking payment of the PPI 
and TID benefits. 
19. On 217/08, Counsel prepared and filed a Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing 
on the grounds that PPI and other benefits were seriously past due and that Claimant had a 
definitive financial need for his workers' compensation benefits. The motion was supported by 
the affidavit of Counsel Andrew Marsh. 
20. In addition, the motion sought "an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §72-
804 ... [because] Defendants, without reasonable ground and without explanation, and despite 
repeated demands from Claimant's counsel, have failed to pay statutory benefits for loss of an 
eye in a workplace accident" 
21. On 218/08, Counsel prepared and filed interrogatories and requests for production 
on defendants. 
22. On 2113/08, defendants filed their Answer to the Complaint in which they 
conceded that PPI benefits were due. 
23. On or about that same time, defendants contacted Counsel for Claimant proposing 
terms of payment ofPPI benefits. Upon reaching agreement, Counsel filed a Notice Of 
Withdrawal Of Motion Requesting Emergency Hearing (including a withdrawal of Counsel's 
demand for attorney fees under I.C. §72-804) which read in pertinent part: "Defendant Liberty 
Northwest has contacted Counsel for Plaintiff and stated that they would begin paying permanent 
partial impairment benefits if Claimant would withdraw the Motion Requesting Emergency 
Hearing filed 217/08." But for the efforts of Counsel, Claimant would not have received his 
PPI benefits and/or would not have received them as soon as he did. 
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24. On 2114/08, the first PPI check was received, which was nearly four months after 
the surgery that gave rise to the eligibility for benefits. On 2/22108, the TID check was received. 
But for the efforts of Counsel, Claimant would not have received his TID benefits and/or 
would not have received them as soon as he did. 
25. Following the evisceration surgery, Counsel and his paralegal spent much time 
working on arrangements with specialist Sam Murano for authorization and provision of an 
ocular prosthetic. Counsel subsequently requested and obtained from Murano a projection for 
future prosthesis care and replacement for purposes of proving and negotiating future medical 
care benefits for Claimant. 
26. ,Following the 1MB report from Dr. Radnovich, Counsel recommended and 
arranged for Claimant to obtain a vocational evaluation from specialist Doug Crum, who 
determined that Claimant should be compensated an additiona115% for disability beyond 
impairment. Counsel obtained this report for purposes of proving and negotiating PPD benefits 
for Claimant. 
27. Prior to lump sum negotiations, Counsel reviewed Claimant's wage history with 
the date-of-injury employer and concluded that his average weekly wage was higher than that 
which Surety had used in the calculations of the original TID benefits, and that there had been 
previous periods for which Claimant had not been paid TIDs. Counsel provided his evidence 
and calculations to defendants for purposes of proving and negotiating compensation for 
Claimant for underpaid TIDs and unpaid TIDs. Defendants disagreed and refused to pay any 
additional sums for TIDs. 
28. Counsel advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor on education, 
training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts. 
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29. Counsel advised Claimant of the meaning and import of the job site evaluation 
from the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division. 
30. Upon receipt of Defendant's discovery requests, Counselor his legal assistant met 
with Claimant and prepared responses. Counsel reviewed these responses, made revisions, 
counseled with his assistant and Claimant, and served the responses on Defendants and a notice 
of service on the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
31. Counsel prepared a request for mediation and notice of service, filed originals 
with the Idaho Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants, and then participated in 
mediation in 2008. The parties reached a settlement agreement in mediation, but the Commission 
or its staff refused to approve the settlement. 
32. Subsequently, Counsel resumed negotiations with Defendants, and on or about 
10/22109, reached a new lump sum settlement agreement, which is the subject of this document. 
Although Counsel is entitled by law and by the Constitution to receive attorney fees for 
having obtained the PPI benefit for Claimant, Counsel has waived his right to said fees in 
order to ensure that the new LSSA will receive the approval of the Commission. 
33. Separately from the LSSA, and prior to the LSS agreement even being reached, 
the surety sent Counsel its check dated 10/9/09 in the sum of $1243.00, which the surety 
intended as a payment (without admission of liability) of disputed attorney fees on Counsel's 
demand for attorney fees due pursuant to I.C. 72-804 for alleged unreasonable denial or delay in 
payment of PPI benefits. The cover letter for said check is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. As part 
of the final LSS negotiations, Counsel agreed to accept surety's check as Counsel's sole and 
meager compensation for the enormous time, effort, and expertise expended by Counsel to get 
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the surety to start paying PPI benefits. The attorney fee represented by the surety's check is not 
coming out of any benefit funds of Claimant. 
dispute, and this firm will not be seeking any attorney fees from our client on the PPI. 
34. Following the oral agreement between the parties for a new LSSA, on or about 
11102/09 Counsel refunded to Claimant the attorney fees he had previously received, pursuant to 
law and the Constitution, for having obtained the PPI benefit for Claimant. Having done so, 
Counsel now has not and will not be receiving any attorney fees for having obtained the PPI 
benefits for Claimant. 
35. At the time Counsel became involved, all issues were disputed or disputable 
because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a 
matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of 
all compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's 
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment 
that Defendants might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel 
was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time 
loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney 
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that 
constituted available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth 
above. For the lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes 
available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth above. 
36. There are compensation benefits, as set forth above, available for distribution on 
equitable principles. The services of Counsel operated primarily or substantially to secure the 
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid, due to Counsel's efforts on behalf of Claimant 
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and due to Counsel's reputation as a plaintiffs lawyer in the practice of worker's compensation 
law. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from 
the client, as set forth in the Attorney Fee Agreement attached hereto. The claim is limited to 
costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised. There 
are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien, 
including as follows: Claimant sought the services of Counsel as counselor and advocate; 
Claimant contracted with Counsel to pay Counsel for said services; Counsel provided services as 
counselor and advocate; Counsel has a constitutionally-protected property right to be paid as 
agreed; and Claimant has a constitutionally-protected right to have Claimant's contract with 
Counsel honored. All terms used in this and the preceding paragraph are used by Counsel in the 
context of their fair and reasonable meaning pursuant to, and as limited by, statutory and 
Constitutional law. 
37. Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel engaged in 
extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant 
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with 
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing. 
38. Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would 
be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers. 
Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for 
resolution to the Commission. 
39. Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants 
resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that 
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship. 
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40. Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimanfs best judgment and 
personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been 
submitted to the Commission for its approval. 
41. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed 
portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant. 
42. Co~el reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing 
program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and 
other financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial 
Commission Form 1022. 
43. As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between 
Claimant and Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately 
4/1812007 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his.practice by declining 
certain cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel 
maintained an office and staff, including the services of a fuil-:time legal assistant, to be able to 
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his 
other clients. 
44. Claimant is presently unemployed. 
10 
Dated November" 2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
-4.~ /.'la-4. ... 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
to 
I CERTIFY that on November~ 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be served as follows: 
KentW.Day 
Harmon, Whittier & Day 
6213 N. Cloverdale Road, Suite 150 
Boise ID 83707-6358 
~ Hand delivery 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Andrew@ldahoRlghts.com 
I CLIENT NAME 
Jose Renteria 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
03/31/07 Balance forward 
04/18/07 Copies - initial client copies 
05/01107 Copies - Initialltr to nc 
05/01/07 Postage 
05/01/07 Long Distance 
06/04/07 Long Distance 
08116/07 Copies - Paystubs and Moo Rec copies 
10/11/07 Postage - Op info 
10/15107 Copies - Ltr to Hart 
10/15107 Postage 
11/16107 Copies - Docs to Radnovich 
11/16107 Postage 
11/16/07 compact disc 
11/18107 Renteria, Jose - Report, Dr. Radnovich 
02125/08 Copies - Ltr to Client re ID for check 
02l2SI08 Postage 
02127/08 Copies - Fwd reimbursement check 
02127/08 Postage 
02129/08 Copies - Disco Resp to OPC 
02129/08 Postage 
02129/08 compact disc 
03/18/08 PMT #400089430. Renteria, J. costs 
03/18108 Copies - Fwd TID Check 
03/18/08 Postage 
03/18108 Copies 
03/19/08 PMT #400136023. Renteria, J. costs 
04111/08 Doug Crum., voc eval expert 
04/16/08 PMT #400132549. Renteria, J. costs 
06/04108 File Closing 
07/01108 Copies - Mtn for Emerg Hearing w- Affidavit 
Statement of Costs 
I DATE I 
1119/09 


































I BALANCE DUE II $0.00 
Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your tile. If 
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file 
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2) 
years from the above date. 
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08/07/08 VOID: Copies - Fwd PPI check 
08/07/08 VOID: Postage 







10122109 File Closing 
11/01109 PMT #1102090514. Renteria. J. costs pmt 
Statement of Costs 
I DATE I 
11/9/09 















I BALANCE DUE II $0.00 
Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If 
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file 
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges ofS.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2) 
years from the above date. 
Page 2 
ACUERDO Del HONORARIO De CONTIGENCIA EN UN CASO 
De COMPENSACI6N DE TRABAJADORES (POR ACCIOENTE INDUSTRIAL) 
Este es un acuerdo para la representaa6n y la consulta en una demanda de la 
compensaci6n de trabajadores (par accidente industrial) ante la .Comisi6n 
Industrial de Idaho. Este acuerdo es entre las OFICINAS DE ABOGADOS 
SEINIGER, P.A., 942 Calle Myrtle, Boise, Idaho, 83702, (de aqur en adelante 
designados "Abogado") y Jose Antonio Renteria Sotelo, (de aqur en adelante 
designado "Cliente"). 
El ABOGADO Y EL CliENTE ACUERDAN COMO SIGUE: 
1) EI Abogado representara al Cliente en la siguiente acci6n: con respecto a 
Rentarfa v. Carley Constuctlon, LLC and Liberty Northwest la 
demanda de Ia compansacl6n de trabaJadores (por accidente) 
Industrial) para la tacha delesl6n del dra March 30, 2008 solamenta. 
2) Por la representaa6n del Cliente, se Ie pagara al Abogado un honorario el 
cual estara embargado sobre la causa de la acci6n y sera igual a una 
porci6n de todas las cantidades recuperadas par medio de un arreglo 0 
adjudicaci6n incluyendo los honorario& de abogado, e incluyendo sumas 
recuperadas en la satisfacci6n del mismo de cualquier tercera parte. Esa 
parci6n sera como sigue: 
i) Veinticinco par aento (25%) de todas las cantidades 
obtenidas para el Cliente despues de la finna de este acuerdo 
si el caso se resuelve antes de una audlencla. Sf el Cliente 
esta recibiendo beneficias de incapacidad temporales a la 
hora de la firma de este acuerdo, entonces el Abogado no. 
tomara un porcentaje de ese beneficio hasta que la 
aseguranza deje de pagar eI pago 0 amenaza dejar de pag~r 
el pago de tal beneficio; si el Cliente ha recibido una 
clasificaci6n de impedimento 18 cuat se ha admitido y se esta 
pagando, entonces el Abogado no tomara ningun porcentaje 
del balance de la clasificaci6n de impedimento al menos que 
se dispute despues. 
ii) Treinta par ciento (300/0) de tales cantidades despU8s de una 
Budleneia y la demanda sa resuelve sin entablarse una 
apelaci6n par cuatquiera de las partes; 
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iii) Cuarenta por ciento (40%) de tales cantidades si la demand a 
se resuelve despues de que una apelaci6n se entable por 
cualquiera de las partes; 
EI Abogado tomara un. porcentaJe de cualquier beneficio obtenido por el 
Cllente con respecto al impedlmento parcial pennanente sl una 
clasiflcaci6n se da despues de que las partes flnnen 88te acuerdo. En el 
caso que la Comisi6n conceda los honorarios de Abogado en contra de(l) (los) 
demandado(s), el Abogado tendra ef derecho que se Ie paguen esos honorarios 
de abogado 0 el porcentaje calculado arriba, el que sea mas. 
3) No se Ie exigira al Cliente pagar honorarios de abogado al Abogado si 
no se recupera nada par medio de un arreglo 0 adjudicaci6n a menos que 
el Abogado sa retire debido a la falta de la cooperacl6n del Cliente. En 
caso que se requiera que el Abogado se retire debido a la falta de la 
cooperaci6n en la presentaci6n y el procesamiento de la demanda del 
Cliente, se Ie recompensara (a el) segun 10 dispuesto en el parrafo 7 
abajo. 
4) Los costos actuales requerldos para preparar y procesar la demanda 
del Cllante por el Abogado, 0 para lograr un arreglo, se pagarin por 
el Cllente; si son adelantados por el Abogado, estos costos se pagaran 
de la porci6n del Cliente de las cantidades recuperadas; segun definido en 
la Secci6n 2, arriba; si no sa l!ega a un arrealo en su caSO, Usted sera 
resPOnsable de hacer oaaos por estos costos haSta que estos sa havan 
pagado por completo. Estos costos incluyen los honorarios para los 
investigadores si son empleados par el Abogado, los honorarios de 
entablar el caso, los honorarios para los reporteros de la corte, los costos 
de viajar, los costos del servicio de proceso, los costos para los 
expeejientes y los informes medicos, los costos para los testigos y los 
medicos expertos, los cobros de Ilamadas telef6nicas de larga distancia y 
fax, los costos de corrao yenvlo relacionados con el procesamiento de la 
demanda del Cliente. EI Abogado esta autorizado, pero no esta obligado, 
pagar todas las cuentas medicas pendientes a la hora del arreglo de la 
demanda del Cliente de cualquier fondo recibido por el Abogado al 
proveedor del cuidado mecJico 0 a su agente designado. 
5) EI Cliente acuerda que at no hara un arreglo excepto con la aprobaci6n 
anterior del Abogado, cual aprobaci6n no sera razonablemente retenida. 
5i ef Cliente hace esto, esto infringira este Acuerdo, entonces el Clients 
acuarda pagarle al Abogado Is suma y la parte indicada en el parrafo 2(ii), 
arriba; al arreglarse el caso el Abogado esta autorizado pagar cualquier 
cuenta medica pendiente del Cliente directamente al proveedor. EI 
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Abogado no !legana a un arreglo del caso sin la aprobaci6n anterior del' 
Cliente. 
6) EI Abogado no hace ninguna representaci6n tocante a la probabilidad de 
una resoluci6n con exito del caso del Cliente, y no garantiza obtener 
suficientes fondos para reembolsarle al Cliente por los costos 0 gastos 
incunidos en el procesamiento del caso; se acuerda expUcitamente que 
todas las declaraciones del Abogado sobre estos asuntos son 
declaraciones de opini6n de buena fe soIamente; 
7) EI Abogado puede ser despedido por el Cliente en cualquier momento. Si 
se despide al Abogado, el Abogado sera compensado por los servicios 
rendidos hasta la fecha de la despedida, tam bien por todos los costos. 
gastos y los desembolsos, como sigue: 
i) Si se despide al Abogado antes de que el caso se resuelva 0 
juzgue, entonces se Ie pagara al Abogado el fndice de $150 par 
hora 0 un porcentaje calculado de acuerdo con el parrafo 2 (basado 
entre la oferta de arreglo mas alta, si alguna, hecha por los 
demandados a la hora de la despedida) Ia que sea mas; el Abogado 
Ie proporcionana al Cliente con una declaraci6n detallada de tales 
servicios. 
ii) Si se despide al Abogado despues de que el caso sa resuelva 0 
juzgue, la compensaci6n del Abogado se computara de acuerdo con 
las provisiones de este acuerdo igual como si el veredicto, la 
adjudicaci6n, la determinaci6n 0 el juicio actualmente se haya 
recaudado por completo para el Cliente. 
iii) EI Abogado tiene el derecho de retener la posesi6n de los 
documentos y el dinero del Cliente hasta que la cuenta del Cliente 
se haya pagado por completo, y el Abogado tendra un embargo 
preventivo en la cau~ de acci6n. 
8) il Clienle Ie pagara al Af)egaEts un antiaps inieial eemo aEtelanle aentFa 
los GOstes menoionaEtes en el p.an:afo -4 aFFili)a en la santietaEt ete $100. 
9) EI Cliente acuerda que cualquier interes ganado en cualquiera de los 
fondos del Cliente sostenidos en confianza sera donado a Ia Abogacfa del 
Estado de Idaho con relaci6n con su programa de Interes en las CUentas 
de Confianza de Abogados. 
/~() 
10) Ambos el Cliente y el Abogado han leldo este acuerdo. Henen una copia 
de el, y atuerdan a sus terminos y condiciones. No hay otras 
representaciones orales 0 escritas entre el Cliente y el Abogado. 
Cualquier modificaci6n de ,este contrato sera hecha por escrito. 
11) Este acuerdo sera obligatorio sobre los herederos, sucesores, 
representantes y asignados del Cliente y del Abogado. 
12) Se Ie ha asesorado al Cliente que el Cliente puede recoger una copia del 
expediente en este caso dentro de 30 dlas despues de que sa lIegue a un 
arreglo 0 despues de que sa tennine la relaciOn entre el cliente y el 
abogado par cualquiera de las partes de este acuerdo. Despues de ese 
tlempo, el expedlente del Abogado y tod08 los document08 y cosas 
en 61 de cualquler fuente serin destruid08. 
13) Se Ie ha asesorado al Cliente que el Abogado puede retenerse en una 
base por horas de $150 par hora depositando un anticipo con el Abogado 
de $2,000 el cual se repondra cuando el Abogado cobre de el. En el caso 
que se retenga al Abogado en una base por horas, el Abogado no tendra 
el derecho a ningun porcentaje de cualquier arreglo 0 beneficios 
recuperados par el Cliente. EI Cliente ha denegado retener al Abogado en 
una base por horas y ha elegido retener al Abogada en una base 
contingente descrita en el presente.' 
He lefda el anterior y denego retener al abogado en una base por horas. 
88te dla l~ de A h 7; , de 2002. 
~ 
Jose Antonia Renteria Soltelo 
'J 
I~( 
DECLARACION DE REVELACION (ACCESO) 
1. En asuntos de compensaci6n de trabajadores (par accidente industria!), 
los honorarios de abogado normal mente no exceden el veinticinco por ciento 
(25%) de los beneficios que su abogado obtenga para usted en un caso en el 
cual no se ha completado ninguna aUdiencia en los memos. En un caso en el 
cual una audiencia en los memos se ha completado, los honorarios de abogado 
normal mente no exceden el treinta por ciento (30%) de los beneficios que su 
abogado obtenga para usted. 
2. DependiendO de las circunstancias de su caso, usted y su abogado 
pueclen acordar a un porcentaje m6s alto 0 mas bajo el cual serfa sujeto a 
la aprobaci6n de la Comisi6n. Ademas, si usted y su abogado tienen una 
disputa con respecto a los honorarios de abogado, cualquiera de ustedes 
puede hacer una petici6n a la Comisi6n Industrial para resolver la disputa. 
Certlftco que he Ie(do y entlendo esta declaracl6n de revelacl6n (acceso) y 
Aeuerdo de Honorario de Contingenela, y estoy de aeuerdo eon los 
tennlnos eontenldos en el presentee 
FECHADO este d(a .:Li:- de A b 7" I de 200 1:.... 
Jose An mo Renteria Sotelo 
FECHADO este dla JD..- de kpn t I de 200 1.. 
I 
KentVV.DaY,#4372 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, VVHITTIER & DAY 
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, I b 83707-6358 
Telephone (208)327-7561 
FAX (800) 972-3213 
Employees of the Uberl;y Mutual Group 
Attorney for Defendants 
( . . ;(tCEIVED 
dtiJUS T Hlt.L COMMISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION' 
. OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Jose Antonio Renteria-Sotelo, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) I. C. No.: 2006-507603 
vs. ) 
) 
Rick Carley Construction, LLC, ) 
) STIPULATION AND 
Employer, ) AGREEMENT OF LUMP 
) SUM DISCHARGE AND 
and ) ORDER OF APPROVAL 
) AND DISCHARGE 







In consideration of the premises and promises and covena.nts hereinafter set forth, 
and subject to the above-entitled Commission's approval and Order of Discharge pursuant 
thereto, and fu.rther pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 72-707 and 72-404, the above-entitled 
parties hereby stipulate and agree in favor of the Claimant, Jose Renteria-Sotelo, as 
hereinafter set forth. 
1-8TIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND 
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
~©r /(?3 
I. 
It is agreed that on or about March 30,2006, the Claimant, Jose Renteria-Sotelo, 
was employed by Rick Caney Construction LLC, in the County of Ada Idaho, and on the 
same date the Claimant allegedly sustained an injury as a result of an industrial accident 
arising out of and during the course of employment which he then had with the Defendant, 
Rick Caney Construction LLC. These injuries include, but are not necessarily limited to, 
retina detachment in left eye and loss of vision in left eye with implant. 
All damages, disability, loss, expense and injury, past, present and future, in any 
way resulting from or related to the-alleged accident are finally settled and discharged by 
-this Agreement. This is the case whether or not these damages, disability, loss or 
expense are now known, recognized or foreseen. 
II. 
At all times herein mentioned, Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. was the Surety of said 
Employer under the Workers' Compensation Laws of the state of Idaho. 
III. 
Claimant contends, and Defendants deny, that the Defendants are liable for al/ of 
the medical expenses and compensation pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Laws of 
the State of Idaho as a result of injury sustained from said alleged industrial accident. It is 
Defendants' contention that disputes exist in this claim concerning the nature and extent of 
injuries, the cause and extent of Claimant's permanent _ impairment and disability,-
entitlement to temporary partial and total disability benefits and,probable amount of future 
medical expenses. The parties hereto acknowledge that these are serious questions and 
disputes, and that all differences are compromised and settled by this Agreement. 
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
In consideration of 1I1is Agreement, all parties stipulate that the Commission shall, 
on and by approval hereof, be deemed to adjudicate these issues and all other issues 
arising out of Claimanfs alleged accident and injuries, as provided by the Worbtrs' 
Compensation Laws of1l1e State of Idaho. 
IV. 
At the time of 1I1e alleged accident herein referred to, the Claimant was manied·with 
one dependent(s), and was receMng an average weekly wage of $510.31. 
V. 
It is agreed and stipulated 1I1at on or about Aprl 3, 2006, the Claimant filed a Notice 
of Injury and Claim for Compensation with respect to the aforementioned claims with the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. It is further agreed that Defendants have paid 
Claimanfs medical expenses to date in the sum of $31,612.81. 
The following medical and related expenses have been incurred by Claimant 
following said accident to the present date, none of ~ich have been paid by Defendants 
and all of which will be paid by Claimant from 1I1e proceeds of this lump sum settlement 
NONE. 
Claimant represents that the above itemization of unpaid medical bills is complete and 
aca.arate. and agrees to Pay any medical bilting, whether indicated above or not. that 
remains unpaid as of the date of this Agreement 
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VI. 
By way of settlement of these disputes, the parties agree to the following: 
1. . Medical Expenses Paid by Surety: 
Physicians: 
Intermountain Eye Clinic 
Eagle Eye Surgery & Laser Ctr. 





NW Eye and Laser Center . 
Intermountain Eye & Laser Centers 
Intermountain Ocular Prosthetic 
St. Luke's Regional Medical 
Total: $ 23,639.72 
Hospitals: 
st. Luke's Reg. Med. Ctr 
TravellMileage: 
Jose Renteria-Sotelo 
Medical Service Co. 




Medical Service Co. 
Gateway 
Total: $ 2,281.46 
Total: $ 290.54 
Total: $ 5,401.09 
TOTAL MEDICALS PAID: $ 31,612.81 
4 -STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND 
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
2. Total Temporary Disability 
Benefits Owed by Surety: 
4/17/06 - 9/18/06 
30 weeks, 3 days @ 
$ 341.91 per week 
10/17/07 -11/16107 
4 weeks, 3 days @ 
$ 341.91 per week 
08107108 - 08/07/08 
$ 7,570.86 
$ 1,514.16 
1 Day @$48.84 or $341.91 per week 
TOTAL TID OWED: 
3. Permanent Partial Impainnent: 
Dr. Boemer 
Total Loss of VIsion by Enucleation 
175 weeks@ $310.75 per week 
TOTAL PPI OWED: 
4. Consideration of lump sum settlement, 
disputed compensation benefits of any 
kind, accrued and future; waiver of right 
to reconsideration and to appeal: 
TOTAL LUMP SUM: 
LESS TID PAID: 







TOTAL DUE CLAIMANT: $ 74,685.00 
a. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS: $ 3 38 .59 
*b. Costs taken priorto LSS: , $1533; 60 
c. Additional attorney fees to be taken from LSS; $13,603.07 
d~' Additional costs to be taken from LSS: -0----Subtotal (Add c-I:d): $13.603.07 
Total ClalmanfaFeea and Coats: $l5,575.05 
*COSTS include Claimant's IMB and voc eval experts 
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Itemized list of outstanding medicals to be paid by 
Claimant from LSS balance: _-_0-__ 
Total to Claimant $61,OSl.93 
VII. 
All parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of temporary and permanent 
dlsablity, if any. and the amount of medical and related care and expense in this matter 
are uncertain and In dispute; that pursuant to I.C. § 72-404. it is in the best Interest of the 
parties that the above-entiUed claims be fully, finally and forever discharged upon a lump 
sum payment by Surety in the amount of $74,685.00, such setliement to discharge aI~ 
rights and cJaims to all permanent and temporary compensatiOn, and all medical and 
related benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the 
parties. 
VIII. 
Claimant does indemnify and agree to save Defendants hannless from and against 
any further claim or loss of any and every kind arising out of or related to said alleged 
accident and any resultant loss, damage or injury, including without limit any claim 
respecting past or future hospital, medical or like expense. 
IX. 
In making this Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Settlement. all parties 
acknowledge and agree that neither Defendant admits the allegations of Claimant. this 
Agreement being solely for the purpose of adjudication and settlement of doubtful and 
disputed cJa~. 
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X. 
This Agreement is made at Claimant's request and is the acceptance by the 
Claimant of the offer of the Surety. By this instrument, Claimant requests settlement be 
made in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and further petitions 
the Commission for approval hereof and Order of Discharge pursuant hereto. Employer 
and Surety herein join in said petition and stipulate that it shall be granted. 
XI. 
Claimant acknowledges that he has carefully read this Agreement and legal 
instrument in its entirety, understands its contents, and has executed the same knowing 
. that this Agreement forever concludes and fully and finally disposes of any and all claim of 
every kind and character he has or may have against the Employer and Surety on account 
of the alleged accident and injury on March 30, 2006. 
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the Defendants shall pay the 
sum within fifteen days following their receipt of the approved and conformed copy of this 
entire agreement. Any interest allowable under the Workmen's Comperysation Laws of 
the State of Idaho will not begin to accrue until after the flfteen-day period. 
Claimant further acknowledges that he is represented by Andrew Marsh, legal 
counsel, in these claims and has reviewed the contents of the Agreement with his 
attorney, who has explained the contents hereof and apprised Claimant of the 
consequences of his acceptance and execution. 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IN EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT THESE 
PROCEEDINGS ARE CONCLUDED AND FOREVER CLOSED BY REASON THEREOF, 
SUBJECT ONLY TO COMMISSION APPROVAL AND ORDER, AND THAT CLAIMANT 
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WILL NOT THEREAFTER BE ABLE TO REOPEN THE SAME FOR ANY PURPOSE. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Claimant and Defendants hereby petition the Industrial 
Commission for a lump sum settlement as evidenced by these presents. 
DATED this ~day of November, 2009 
Jose Rentelfa:Sbtelo, Claimant 
. .. '') 
_/ .AJ /., 
.Y~:#--· 
APPROVED: 
BY.~~ An ewMarsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
KentW. Day I 
Attorney for Defendants 
~
.~.-
~. ~~--" ~~=:: '~'.~-. - . eever-- -- ~ 
Liberty Northwest I . Corp. . 
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE 
UPON LUMP SUM PAYMENT 
The foregoing stipulation, agreement and petition having duly and regularly come 
before this Commission and that pursuant to I.C. § 72-404, it is in the best interests of the 
parties that approving said agreement and Order of Discharge be granted as prayed for, 
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing stipulation and agreement shall be, and the 
same hereby is, APPROVED; and further, 
Said petition shall be and hereby is granted and the above-entitled proceedings are 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the -11t- day of November, 2009, a true and 
correct copy of the STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE 
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE, I.C."#2006-507603, was served by first 
class mail, postage prepaid upon each of the following: 
KentW. Day 
Law Offices of Harmon, Whittier & Day 
6213 N Cloverdale Road 
Suite 150 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, 1083707-6358 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney at Law 
942 Myrtle St. 
Boise, 10 83702 
JL r. 8 .. L ,,' 
10 -STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND 
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
REC'D NOV 1 7 2009 17~ 
